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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-When Plaintiff Participates in a Scheme
Initiated by Defendant, In Pari Delicto Is
No Bar to Recovery
Plaintiffs' brought a treble damage antitrust suit2 against their
franchisor, a distributor of automotive parts,3 alleging that their fran-
chise agreements4 with defendant created a restraint of trade in viola-
tion of section one of the Sherman Act 5 and section three of the
Clayton Act.6 The franchise agreements gave plaintiffs exclusive ter-
ritories for the sale of "Midas Mufflers" at fixed prices and required
that plaintiffs buy all parts exclusively from defendant. Plaintiffs
made substantial profits from their franchises and sought and obtained
additional Midas shops.8 After being denied the opportunity to
1. Plaintiffs were four Midas Muffler dealers, each of whom did business separately
from the others in a different part of the country between 1955 and 1960.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) provides that any person who is injured in his business
or property by reason of violation of the antitrust laws may sue for treble damages in
any district court of the United States.
3. Named as defendants were International Parts Corp., three of its subsidiary
corporations, plus six individual officers or agents of the corporate defendants. These
ten separate legal persons constituted a single trading entity by which a family-owned
business was conducted. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376
F.2d 692, 693 (7th Cir. 1967).
4. The terms of the franchise agreement did not provide for a franchise fee, con-
struction expense, purchase of capital equipment from defendants, or lease of real
estate or equipment. It could be cancelled on 30 days notice. The franchisee was
granted a license to use the trademarks "Midas" and "Midas Muffler Shop" and in
return agreed to buy all exhaust system parts from International, to sell at prices fixed
by defendants, and to refrain from selling or handling any automotive parts of any
other distributor. The dealers were able to purchase directly from the manufacturer,
International Parts, at considerable savings, but were prohibited from handling any
automotive parts except exhaust system parts. Id. at 694.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) declares unlawful combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964) prohibits the making of a contract to fix prices for goods
or to prevent purchases from competitors when the effect is to lessen competition or
to create a monopoly.
7. The Midas plan was originated in 1955 by International Parts. The plan was to
create a network of shops specializing in automotive exhaust system service and
maintaining an atmosphere of cleanliness, comfort, and prompt service. The plan also
included the Midas guarantee to replace in any Midas shop in the country any Midas
muffler that failed to last as long as the customer owned the car. 376 F.2d at 694-95.
8. The franchises were so successful that each of the four plaintiffs actively sought
and obtained additional franchises during their participation in the Midas program.
One plaintiff made over $200,000 in profits during his years as a franchisee. Id. at
696-97.
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purchase certain parts at lower prices elsewhere, plaintiffs terminated
their agreements with defendant and joined a Midas competitor.1
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding that plaintiffs voluntarily and actively participated in the
scheme and were barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto, and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed." On certiorari, the Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Where an injured party utilizes an illegal scheme formulated
and carried out by others, the doctrine of in pari delicto will not bar
recovery in a private antitrust suit. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
When the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted by Congress, several
alternate bills expressly allowing the defense of in pari delicto12 were
rejected, indicating that Congress did not intend the defense to bar
recovery.13 However, an early decision' 4 permitted the defense, and
subsequent congressional amendments have neither granted nor with-
held the defense. Almost all early lower court decisions' 5 permitted
the defendant to raise in pari delicto as a bar to plaintiff's recovery.
These decisions rested on the principles recognized in equity and
common law that the law should refuse to enforce an illegal bargain
and should leave equally guilty parties where it finds them.'6 An
exception to this rule was made and recovery allowed when a plain-
tiff had severed his relationship with the unlawful scheme and
9. Three of the plaintiffs cancelled when they were denied additional franchises.
The fourth was cancelled by defendant over a controversy regarding the exclusive
dealing provision. Id.
10. After their relationship with International was severed, all plaintiffs became
members of the Robin Hood franchise program which encompassed items other than
exhaust systems and provided no guarantee on its leading muffler. Plaintiffs felt that
the requirements of this agreement were less restrictive than those of the International
agreement. Id.
11. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1967). The district court decision was not reported. Plaintiffs also alleged a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), which prohibits price discrimina-
tion between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality and the
granting of discriminatory rebates. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
order of summary judgment for defendant on this issue, and it was not considered in
the instant case. 376 F.2d at 703-04.
12. In pari delicto literally means "in equal guilt." When it is invoked as a defense
the law refuses to aid the guilty plaintiff and does not allow him to profit from his
own wrongs. At common law the defense is frequently applied when the guilt of
plaintiff is considerably less than that of defendant.
13. See Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private Antitrust Suits-The Defense of
In Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. Rv. 785, 787 (1956) and documents cited.
14. Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 F. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1900).
15. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921); Bluefields S.S.
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1 (3d Cir. 1917), dismissed on stipulation, 248 U.S.
595 (1919); Morny v. Western Union Tel. Co., 40 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
16. See Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964).
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claimed damages sustained only after such severance.' 7 The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, has stressed the public nature of the private
treble damage action, and has never expressly recognized the in pari
delicto defense,18 regarding plaintiffs as "private attorneys generar' for
the enforcement of antitrust legislation.19 Hence, when it has consid-
ered in pari delicto, the Court has restricted the defense. In Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,20 the Court held the defense
inapplicable where a plaintiff's guilt consists of participation in illegal
activity other than that sued upon. In Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,23
the Court held that a plaintiff cannot be in pari delicto if his participa-
tion was the result of economic coercion.P In such a situation plain-
tiff's acquiescence in the violation is the only feasible way he can do
business and can hardly be said to be voluntary. Following the Kiefer-
Stewart and Simpson decisions, the application of the in pari delicto
defense has remained questionable in two situations: when plaintiff
voluntarily enters into the illegal activity, and when his guilt is equal
to that of defendant. Lower courts have divided on these issues.
Reasoning that notions of fairness are offended if a plaintiff recovers
treble damages on an agreement under which he has profited,23 some
courts have held that the voluntary participant cannot complain of
a wrong arising from his illegal activity.2 Other courts have allowed
recovery when plaintiff's guilt was voluntary but not equal to that of
17. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 101 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir.
1939); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810 (3d Cir. 1921).
18. "[F]ounded upon broad conceptions of public policy, the prohibitions of the
statute were enacted to prevent not the mere injury to an individual which would
arise from the doing of the prohibited acts, but the harm to the general public ....
D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174 (1915).
19. "It is clear Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforce-
ment .. " Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
20. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Kiefer-Stewart was a liquor wholesaler who bought from
Seagram and other distillers. In a treble damage action by Kiefer-Stewart based on
the distilleries' price fixing agreement, the distilleries interposed as a defense an agree-
ment between Kiefer-Stewart and other wholesalers setting minimum resale prices. The
Court held that an illegal agreement other than the one sued on could not be used
as a defense and allowed Kiefer-Stewart to recover.
21. 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Simpson was a consignment dealer for Union Oil Co. undel
an agreement which granted him a commission for gasoline sales at prices set by
Union. After plaintiff sold below the prices fixed by Union, both his franchise and
lease were cancelled. The Court reasoned that since Congress intended to prohibit agree-
ments such as this and provided for private sanctions to enforce them, a party who has
been coerced into participating in an illegal agreement should not be denied recovery
by reason of such involuntary participation.
22. This exception was recognized earlier in Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 653
(2d Cir. 1945).
23. See Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
24. Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1966);
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209
F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
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defendant.25 Since each case is based on a unique factual situation, no
general rule has evolved as to when plaintiff's involvement in an
illegal scheme becomes "equal to that of defendant so as to invoke
the defense.
In the instant case, the Court first noted the public purpose of
private antitrust litigation and the absence of congressional intention
to make in pari delicto a defense to treble damage actions. The Court
found that such common law defenses would discourage plaintiffs from
bringing action and thereby curtail the effectiveness of antitrust
laws;2 therefore, the in pari delicto defense should not be broadly
applied in antitrust actions.27 Turning to the facts before it, the Court
disagreed with the lower court finding that plaintiffs had voluntarily28
and actively2 participated in the illegal scheme. Rather, the parties
were found to be in an unequal bargaining position, similar to the
situation in Simpson, wherein the plaintiff could either acquiesce in
the illegal agreement or go out of business. While concluding that
in pari delicto is inapplicable when such a scheme is formulated by
another and merely utilized by plaintiff,.3 the Court expressly refused
to decide whether recovery would be barred if plaintiffs had actively
formulated and perpetuated the illegal program.31 Five justices in
25. E.g., Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Lyons v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Waldron v. British
Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). These courts indicated that if the
plaintiff's conduct were sufficiently immoral, the defense of in pari delicto would be
allowed.
26. "The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally
reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the over-
riding public policy in favor of competition. A more fastidious regard for the
relative moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining the useful-
ness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. And permitting the
plaintiff to recover a windfall gain does not encourage continued violations by those in
his position since they remain fully subject to civil and criminal penalties for their own
illegal conduct." 392 U.S. at 139.
27. "We therefore bold that the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope,
contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." Id.
at 140.
28. "Although petitioners may be subject to some criticism for having taken any part
in respondent's allegedly illegal scheme and for eagerly seeking more franchises and
more profits, their participation was not voluntary in any meaningful sense. They
sought the franchises enthusiastically but they did not actively seek each and every
clause of the agreement." Id. at 139.
29. "These statements completely refute respondents' argument that petitioners were
active participants and show, to the contrary, that the illegal scheme was thrust upon
them by Midas." Id. at 141.
30. The opinion suggests that plaintiffs' damages might be reduced by the profits
received through restraints beneficial to them. Id. at 140. Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring, considered this unworkable because of the extreme difficulty of determining
which restraints caused what profits and in what amount. Id. at 152.
31. The Court's opinion indicates that if recovery is to be barred in such a situation,
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four separate opinions2 agreed with the Court's decision on the facts
before it, but felt the doctrine of in par delicto should not be alto-
gether abolished in private antitrust litigation. In each opinion the
view was clearly expressed that a plaintiff who actively formulates
and perpetuates an illegal plan and whose guilt is substantially equal
to that of defendant will not be allowed to recover.3
The problem faced by the Court in this case was two-fold: (1)
balancing the public interest in private antitrust suits with the funda-
mental notion of justice that one shall not profit from his own wrong-
doing; and (2) deciding when a plaintiff's own illegal conduct should
bar his recovery in a treble damage suit. The Court handled the first
problem in a manner consistent with prior decisions by coming down
strongly on the side of the public interest. In so doing, however, the
Court used ambiguous language which seems to abolish the defense
of in par delicto34 and created a semantic problem which it failed to
resolve. However, analysis of the majority and concurring opinions
reveals that the concept of in par delicto was not in fact abolished as
a defense. What was struck down was the broad scope of the "com-
mon law" in pari delicto barrier which denies recovery for any guilt
whatsoever on the part of plaintiff. Though the in pari delicto doc-
trine is, by that name, given broad application in other contexts, the
Court declares such application inappropriate in private antitrust
suits created to protect the public interest. The instant holding
amounts to a condemnation of the "common law" manifestations of the
doctrine, but it does not mean that the concept of "equal guilt" is
abolished as a defense in private antitrust suits. Five justices sensed
the Court's ambiguity on this point and sought to clarify the view
that recovery will be barred whenever guilt is literally or substantially
"equal" on the part of both plaintiff and defendant. The Court refused
it should not be labeled an in pari delicto defense because of the complexity of the
common law notions surrounding that term. Id. at 140.
32. Justices White, Fortas and Marshall wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Justice
Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring and dissenting opinion felt
that rather than remand for trial, the Court should order the motion for summary
judgment reconsidered in the light of a clearer understanding of in par! delicto.
33. Mr. Justice White argued that allowing one who formulates an illegal scheme
to recover will work at cross purposes with antitrust policy. "[Aissuring him illegal
profits if the agreement .. . succeeds and treble damages if it fails . . . may encourage
what the Act was designed to prevent." 392 U.S. at 146. Justices Fortas, Marshall
and Harlan stated that if the trial on remand of the instant case shows that plaintiffs
actually bargained for and formulated the illegal restraints, recovery would be denied.
Id. at 148, 150, 156. Mr. Justice Harlan felt that neither the "consent" situation of
the instant case, the "economic coercion" situation of Simpson, 377 U.S. 13 (1964),
nor the "independent illegal activity" situation of Kieffer-Stewart, 340 U.S. 211 (1950),
are true cases of in pari delicto, which should mean guilt that is literally or sub-
stantially equal. 392 U.S. at 154-55.
34. See note 27 supra.
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to make such a clarification, leaving open the question of when a
plaintiff's involvement is such that his guilt is "equal" to that of de-
fendant. In this case, plaintiffs who made handsome profits from their
illegal agreements were treated as having been economically coerced,
and therefore allowed to recover. Future courts could have profited
from a discussion of the kind of conduct necessary to preclude plain-
tiff's recovery. The five concurring justices tried to fill this gap, but
unfortunately, their opinions do not carry the authority of the Court.
Many of these issues may be laid to rest when the Court can make
such a decision with a full trial record before it rather than a motion
for summary judgment. Because it treated the facts of this case as
falling within the category of "economic coercion," the Court made
no substantial change in prior law. However, several obscure areas of
private antitrust law were elucidated, and may be of help to future
litigants. First, plaintiff's voluntariness in making an illegal agreement
will not, by itself, bar his recovery; second, the fact a plaintiff has
made substantial profits from a scheme does not preclude his bringing
suit on the illegal agreement; third, the predominating consideration
in such actions is the public interest in encouraging the private
antitrust suit, and courts will view the facts of each case in the light
most favorable to permitting trial; and fourth, the in pari delicto
defense, whether by that name or some other, will not be available
unless a plaintiff has equal bargaining power with defendant and has
actively formulated and perpetuated the illegal scheme.
Civil Rights-Amusement Park Is Covered by Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Plaintiff, a Negro, filed suit in federal district court seeking to
enjoin defendant amusement park, which operates mechanical rides
and a skating rink, from denying Negroes the use of its facilities.'
Plaintiff contended that defendant's exclusion of Negroes from the
park violated section 201(b)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibits racial discrimination in "any motion picture house,
theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition
or entertainment."2 Defendant contended that his amusement park
was not a "place of exhibition or entertainment" within the meaning of
the statute on the ground that it had no exhibits or performances for
the entertainment of spectators. The district court entered judgment
1. Defendant also operated concession stands serving refreshments, but it was
stipulated by the parties that coverage would not be claimed on this basis.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1964).
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for the defendant3 and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.4
On rehearing en banc, held, reversed. An amusement park which
operates mechanical rides and a skating rink is a "place of entertain-
ment" within the meaning of section 201(b) (3) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342
(5th Cir. 1968).
The first federal legislation to prohibit racial discrimination in
public accommodations was the Civil Rights Act of 1875.5 That act
was quickly declared unconstitutional, however, on the ground that
the fourteenth amendment, upon which it was based, applied only
to state action, and not to actions by private individuals.6 The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 sought to avoid this problem by basing its public
accommodations section7 on the commerce clause as well as the
fourteenth amendment.8 That section provides that all persons are
entitled to equal enjoyment of any "public accommodation" without
discrimination because of race, religion, or national origin.9 It enu-
merates four types of establishments which are to be considered "public
accommodations" within the meaning of the Act if their operations
affect commerce or are supported by state action: (1) lodgings for
transient guests; (2) eating facilities and gas stations; (3) "any motion
picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;"' 0 and (4) any establishment
which is located within any of the establishments covered above, or
within which is located a covered establishment." Following the pass-
age of the Act there was some speculation in legal literature as to
whether the third category, places of exhibition or entertainment,
would include places of participation sports, such as bowling alleys and
swimming pools; most of the writers concluded that such places would
not be included.'2 Several district court cases have discussed this
question, reaching similar conclusions. In Kyles v. Paul13 a federal
3. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. La. 1966).
4. 391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1967).
5. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
6. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
8. The constitutionality of the act has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Katzen-
bach v. MeClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
10. Plaintiff claimed the amusement park came within this subsection as a place of
entertainment.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964).
12. BtuEAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RiGnTs ACT OF 1964 83 (1964);
Rasor, Regulation of Public Accommodations via the Commerce Clause, 19 Sw. L.J.
329, 331 (1965); Sanders, The Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 27 TEXAS B.J. 931, 1016
(1964).
13. 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
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district court held that an outdoor recreational facility for swimming,
boating and picnicking was not a "place of exhibition or entertain-
ment" within the meaning of the Act. In reaching this conclusion the
court applied the rule of ejusdem generi14 and said that the phrase
"other place of exhibition or entertainment" must refer to places
similar to those expressly mentioned in the statute (motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, sports arena stadium), and thus must be
places in which one is passively entertained and participation is
minimal. In Adams v. Fazzio Real Estate Co.'5 another district court
said that, on the basis of legislative history, bowling alleys were not
"places of entertainment" within the meaning of the Act. 16 Several
other district court cases have implied, by way of dicta, that "places
of entertainment," as used in the Act, includes only establishments
where performances are presented, 17 and where entertainment is
essentially passive.
The court in the instant case rejected the conclusion of the afore-
mentioned writers' 8 and district courts' 9 that the Act does not cover
places of participant sports. According to this court, the broad legis-
lative purpose of ending racial discrimination in places open to the
public overrides the rule of ejusdem generis,20 which would limit the
term "other places of entertainment" in the statute to establishments
where performances are presented to entertain spectators.21 The court
stated that, even if this section of the Act were limited to places where
performances are presented, an amusement park and skating rink
would still be within its scope since many of the patrons come to
watch the "performance" of the other patrons, particularly their own
14. "[U]nder the maxim, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by
a more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase is held to refer to things
of the same kind, or things that fall within the classification of the specific terms."
Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 267 (10th Cir. 1963).
15. 268 F. Supp. 630, 633 (E.D. La. 1967).
16. However, the particular bowling alley in that case was covered by the Act
because it contained a lunch counter. Id.
17. In Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966), the court
found a golf course to be within the section, because it presented tournaments that
moved in interstate commerce. The court implied that if no tournaments had been
held, the golf course could not have been considered a "place of entertainment" within
the meaning of the Act. An alternative ground for the holding was a lunch counter
operated by the golf course. See also Robertson v. Johnston, 249 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.
La. 1966), ret'd on other grounds, 367 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967), where the court held
that a "cabaret" or "nightclub" is a "place of exhibition or entertainment," implying in
dicta that the term must be limited to places where entertainment is presented.
18. See note 12 supra.
19. See Adams v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., 268 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. La. 1967);
Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967); note 17, supra.
20. See note 14 supra.
21. The statute lists motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas
and stadiums.
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children, as they participate in the activities. As to the second require-
ment for coverage under the statute, that the "place of entertain-
ment" must present "films, performances, athletic teams, exhibi-
tions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce,"2
the court held that since the mechanical rides, although now affixed to
the ground, had been manufactured in another state, and many of
the participating patrons who were "entertaining" other spectator
patrons, came from out-of-state, this requirement was also met.
Although the court has reached what may be a sociologically and
philosophically correct result, a close analysis of the wording of the
statute and its history indicates that this result is beyond that in-
tended by Congress. Although the legislative history of the statute
is generally inconclusive on the question, 3 at least some parts of the
history indicate that places of participant sports were not intended
to be covered. For example, when the bill was presented to the
Senate, Senator Magnuson, floor manager of Title II, stated that dance
studios, bowling alleys, and billard parlors would be exempt from
coverage as places of entertainment;2A when the bill was reported
out of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Kastenmeier
criticized its narrow coverage, commenting that it would allow dis-
crimination to continue in "bowling alleys and other places of rec-
reation and participation sports, unless such places served food."25
Despite this criticism no change was made. Other factors also indi-
cate that the Act was meant to cover only establishments where
spectators are passively entertained by some type of performance,
rather than places of participant sports. First, there is the statutory
requirement that a place of entertainment will be held to "affect
commerce" (and thus be covered by the Act) only if it customarily
presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions or other
sources of entertainment which move in commerce.2 This clearly
implies than an establishment which does not present some type of
show or performance is not covered; thus places of participant
sports would be excluded. The court's characterization of patrons'
participation as a "performance" is strained in itself; it breaks down
completely, however, in that such a "performance" is not "presented"
by the establishment. Secondly, there is the ejusdem generis
issue, in which the court seems to ignore the fact that the legislative
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(3) (1964).
23. An excellent summary of the pertinent legislative history was filed as a memo-
randum by the United States in the first hearing of this case before the circuit court;
it is reported as an appendix to that decision. 391 F.2d 86, 89 (1967) (appendix).
24. 110 CONC. REC. 7407 (1964) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
25. H. R. ReP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1963).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (3) (1964).
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purpose was to prohibit racial discrimination only in certain
selected types of public establishments.2 7 In other words "Congress
.. .exclude[d] some establishments from the Act ...for reasons
of policy . . ... 2 As stated by the Attorney General before the
House Judiciary Committee, Title II did not include many establish-
ments within Congress's reach, because it was hoped that either local
legislation would take care of them or that enforcement in the es-
tablishments covered by the Act would induce voluntary non-dis-
criminatory practices in other establishments, thus making coverage
by federal legislation unnecessary.29 Had Congress intended for par-
ticipation establishments such as bowling alleys, swimming pools, and
amusement parks to be covered, it would seem that at least one such
establishment would have been enumerated in the statute. Several
factors might explain Congress's intent to exempt participant establish-
ments.30 In addition to legislative compromise, the Congress may
have felt it more likely that violence might result from the forced
integration of places where people actively participate and often
compete, than in places where the patrons are passively entertained,
as in a movie theater. Finally, the question of whether the exhibition
or performance moves in commerce provided Congress with an easy
and efficient test of coverage.31 In the case of places of participant
sports, this test could not be used since there is no exhibition or per-
formance involved. In summary, the instant court seems to have lost
sight of the fact that the public accommodations section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at only selected types of establish-
ments, with certain other types deliberately excluded. While the
decision may be justifiable on moral or sociological grounds, it has
certainly broadened the intended scope of the Act.
27. That the legislature purposely excluded some types of public establishments that
could have been brought within the scope of the Act is recognized by the instant
court in its opinion. 394 F.2d 342, 350 (1968).
28. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964); Miller
v. Amusement Eenterprises, 391 F.2d 86, 91 (5th Cir. 1967) (appendix).
29. Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., Part IV, at 2655-56 (1963); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 391 F.2d 86,
91 (5th Cir. 1967) (appendix).
30. Many places of participant sports are covered under other sections of the Act;
for instance, a bowling alley which serves food would come under 42 U.S.C. § 200 0a
(1964).




Plans Are Not To Be Used When More Effective
Means for Desegregation Are Available
Negro children in Virginia brought a class action seeking injunctive
relief against respondent New Kent County School Board's continued
maintenance of an alleged racially segregated school system.' Five
months after the suit was brought, the school board adopted a free-
dom-of-choice plan for the desegregation of the schools. 2 After the
plan was filed, the district court denied petitioner's prayer for an
injunction, and approved the amended freedom-of-choice plan, which
also provided for the employment and assignment of teachers and
staff on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.3 Sitting en banc, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the approval of the free-
dom-of-choice provisions, but remanded the case for a more specific
order regarding the teachers and staff.4 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed. A freedom-of-choice plan
1. Segregated operation of the school system was continued even after the Brawn
v. Board of Education decisions, apparently on the authority of several statutes
enacted by the Virginia legislature in resistance to such decisions. Some of these statutes
were held to be unconstitutional. E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Adkins v. School Bd.,
148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957); James v. Almond,
170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959); Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636
(1959). The Pupil Placement Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 22-232.1 to -232.17 (1964),
which was not repealed until 1966, divested local boards of the authority to assign
children to certain schools and gave the authority to the state board. Children were
automatically reassigned to the school previously attended unless upon application the
state board assigned them elsewhere. As of September 1964, no Negro student bad
applied for admission to the New Kent school under that statute.
2. The school board did this in order to remain eligible for federal financial aid.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided that: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color or natural origin, be excluded in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare issued regulations covering racial discrimination in
federally-aided school systems, as directed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964), which
allowed school systems in the process of desegregation to remain qualified for federal
funds. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76 (1968). Freedom-of-choice plans are
among those considered acceptable by HEW, so long as the plan is in fact effective.
45 C.F.R. § 181.54 (1968). If a school system agrees to comply with a final order
of a court of the United States for the desegregation of such school system then it
is in compliance with the statute. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c) (1968).
3. 11 RAcE RIEL. L. REP. 1300 (1966).
4. Green v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967). The case was
decided per curiam on the basis of the opinion in Bowman v. County School Bd., 382
F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967) (an unrestricted right to attend the school of one's choice
is not a denial of any constitutional right to be free from racial discrimination).
Judges Sobeloff and Winter concurred with the remand on the teacher-assignment
issue. They otherwise disagreed, saying that the district court should be directed
to set up procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of the freedom-of-choice plans.
Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1967).
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violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
when there are reasonable alternatives that promise a speedier and
more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system; and
courts should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed
segregation has been completely removed. Green v. New Kent County
School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).5
Fourteen years ago, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, basing its
decision on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
decided for the first time that Negroes were constitutionally entitled
to attend public schools on a nonsegregated basis.6 One year later in
Brown II, the Court declared that desegregation was to proceed
"with all deliberate speed."8 Interpreting Brown II, the Court in
Cooper v. Aaron9 maintained that only a prompt start, "diligently and
earnestly pursued," would constitute a good faith compliance with
that decision. Authorities were "duty bound" to devote their time to
bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in the public
school system. 10 A widespread response to this duty was the enact-
ment of pupil placement laws," which conferred varying degrees of
discretion upon either state or local authorities to assign pupils in-
dividually to various schools. Although the laws were initially quite
successful when proffered as desegregation plans,'2 they later met
opposition.13 As a result, "grade-a-year" plans were sometimes adopted
in an attempt to comply with the requirements of the second Brown
decision, but soon it appeared that the door was closing on these
5. In two companion cases decided the same day the Court held a "free transfer"
plan inadequate where three years after its adoption segregation had been maintained
despite attendance-zone lines capable of producing meaningful desegregation, Monroe
v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), and a freedom-of-choice plan inadequate
where no attendance zones existed and after three years no meaningful desegregation
had occurred, Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
8. District Courts were directed to require "a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance" with the first Brown decision. Additional time to carry out desegrega-
tion would only be granted if it was necessary to the public interest and was "consistent
with good faith compliance at the earliest practical date." Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1958).
9. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
11. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 61(1)-(12) (1958); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1519 to
-1525 (Supp. 1957); FrA. STAT. ANN. § 230.232 (1961); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 6334-01
to -08 (Supp. 1956); S.C. CODE § 21-230, 21-247 to -247.7 (1957).
12. Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d
724 (4th Cir. 1956); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372
(N.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
13. Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Northeross v. Board of Educ.,
302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962); Manning v. Board of
Public Instruction, 277 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1960); Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction,
272 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1959).
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plans and that the courts were becoming impatient with transitional
devices. 14 Finally, nine years after Brown II the Supreme Court
decided that the "deliberate speed" standard of that decision was no
longer sufficient. 5 The desire to expedite desegregation resulted in
the enactment of Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16
Title IV authorized the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings
designed to achieve desegregation in public education when he
received a meritorious written complaint,17 or to intervene in existing
school desegregation cases of general public importance.' 8 Title VI
prohibited racial discrimination under any program receiving federal
financial assistance. 19 The practical effect of the legislation was to
shift some of the burden of school desegregation from the federal
courts to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 1965,
the Office of Education issued its first set of uniform standards for
the implementation of Title VI. These were followed by the 1966
guidelines, designed to set forth the requirements to be met for
compliance with Title VI.20 Failure to comply with regulations set
out by the agency, either through an HEW-approved plan or a court-
approved plan, would result in the termination of financial assis-
tance,21 which many states could ill-afford.22 In order to remain
14. In Maxwell v. County Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 373 U.S. 683 (1963), modified, 319 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1963), David-
son County, Tenn., where Nashville is located, submitted a grade-a-year plan for court
approval. While approving the plan, the court required Davidson County to desegregate
immediately the first four grades, thus catching up with Nashville, which had already
done so. In Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1902), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 683 (1963), the court said that the school board's former bad faith
did not commend itself to the court, in a suit asking approval for a minimum desegrega-
tion plan. The board was ordered to move faster than one grade a year.
15. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963). See Calhoun v. Latimer,
377 U.S. 263 (1964). The governing constitutional principles of Brown "no longer
bear the imprint of newly enunciated doctrine." Watson v. City of Memphis, 373
U.S. 526, 529 (1963). A plan that at this late date does not provide for prompt and
effective disestablishment of racial segregation is intolerable. "The time for mere
'deliberate speed' has run out." Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d to 20OOd-4 (1964).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1964).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1964).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
20. The 1966 guidelines, 45 C.F.R. § 181 (Supp. 1966), contain more detailed
procedures for the abolition of racially segregated school systems, but in principle
differ from the 1965 guidelines only in that criteria are set forth by which it may be
determined whether a plan is operating fairly or effectively. 45 C.F.R. § 181.54
(Supp. 1966). See generally U.S. CONt'N ON CIrVI tRGHTs, SourHRN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 10-19 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DESEGREGATION
1966-67].
21. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 80 (1968).
22. Due principally to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA), a significant portion of most school budgets is made up of federal funds.
DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 1-2. Of particular interest is Title I of ESEA providing
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eligible for assistance many states adopted freedom-of-choice plans,
one program considered acceptable under the guidelines.2 However,
only token progress toward desegregation of public schools had been
made in many areas of the South by the fall of 1966.2 Despite evi-
dence as to the frequent ineffectiveness of freedom-of-choice plans,
some courts have committed themselves to the principle that such
plans are not unconstitutional per se, and may actually represent a
valid transitional link in the process of public school desegregation. 2
In approving the use of such plans, these courts first conditioned their
approval on standards drawn up by the courts themselves. 26 However,
in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,27 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the minimum standard to be
applied by the courts in achieving integration was to be the guide-
lines set out by the Office of Education, and that if freedom-of-choice
plans failed to bring about that result, then school authorities were
under an affirmative duty to employ other methods which would insure
success. Even though freedom-of-choice was thus recognized as but
a means to an end,2 8 it remained for the Supreme Court to determine
when the transitional link had taken too long to achieve its goal.
for financial assistance to local educational agencies for the education of children of
low income families. 20 U.S.C. § 241(a)-(1) (Supp. 1966). See generally DESEGRIE-
GA'TION 1966-67, at 80-86.
23. 45 C.F.R. § 181.54 (1968). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported in
1967 that in the 1,787 school districts desegregating in the South, freedom-of-choice
plans were overwhelmingly favored. All of the Alabama, Mississippi, and South
Carolina districts were using freedom-of-choice, and 83% of such districts in Ceorgia
had adopted the same method. DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 45-46.
24. DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 87. Even though the percentage of Negro children
attending schools which were not all Negro doubled during the 1966-67 school year
in the eleven Southern states, more than 90% of the Negro children in the five deep
South states still attend all-Negro schools. The Commission reported that in the
Southern and border states Alabama had the smallest percentage of Negro students
attending predominantly white schools. In Alabama, only 2.4%5 of the Negro students
went to school where they made up less than 95% of the student body. The com-
parable figures in other states were: 3.2% in Mississippi, 3.6% in Louisiana, 4.9%7 in
South Carolina, 6.6% in Georgia, 12.8% in North Carolina, 14.7% in Florida, 15.9%
in Arkansas, 20.0% in Virginia, 21.9% in Tennessee, 34.6% in Texas; and in the
border states, 26.7% in Missouri, 40.5% in Maryland, 40.5% in Oklahoma, 83.4% in
West Virginia, 84.8% in Delaware, and 88.5% in Kentucky. Id. at 101-106.
25. Jackson v. Marvell School Dist., 389 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1968); Kemp v. Beasley,
389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968); Kelly v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
26. Lockett v. Board of Educ., 342 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1965); Gaines v. Dougherty
County Board of Educ., 334 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1964).
27. 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
28. "'Freedom of choice' is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitu-
tionally required end-the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects. If
the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other
means must be used to achieve this end. The school officials have the continuing duty
to take whatever action may be necessary to create a 'unitary, nonracial system."'
Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) (concurring
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In the instant case29 the Court first noted that although the immedi-
ate focus of the second Brown decision was to make initial inroads
into the traditional pattern of exclusion of Negro children from white
schools, the ultimate end to be brought about was and is a unitary,
non-racial system of public education.30 In determining whether the
respondent had taken whatever steps might be necessary to convert
to such a system, the Court noted that the first step3' had not occurred
until ten years after the second Brown decision. Even then, rather
than dismantling the dual system,3 the freedom-of-choice plan had
operated simply to burden the children and their parents with the
initiative in disestablishing segregation, something the second Brown
decision had placed squarely on the school board.3 At this late date,
the Court said that it was incumbent upon the school board to estab-
lish that its proposed plan promised meaningful and immediate
progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.' Noting
that a plan utilizing freedom-of-choice is not an end in itself, the
Court concluded that in situations where other methods are available,
which promise speedier and more effective conversion, freedom-of-
choice plans will be constitutionally unacceptable. However, the
Court was careful to point out that it was not holding freedom-of-
choice plans to be unconstitutional per se, or that such plans might
not be effective in some instances.3 The Court concluded that a new
plan should be formulated which would promise realistically a prompt
conversion to a system without white schools and Negro schools, but
just schools.37
opinion). Accord, Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, af'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
29. The reasoning of this case was also used in Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
443 (1968), and Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). While the
instant case and Raney involve freedom-of-choice, the Monroe case involves a variant
thereof referred to as free transfer. Under free transfer, any child, after he has
complied with the requirement of annual registration in his assigned school in his
attendance zone, may freely transfer to another school of his choice if space is
available.
30. 391 U.S. at436 (1968).
31. The adoption of the freedom-of-choice plan was the first step taken. Id. at 438.
32. In the three years under freedom-of-choice not a single white child had chosen to
attend Watkins school, and 85% of all Negro children still attended the all-Negro
Watkins school. Id. at 441.
33. 391 U.S. at 441 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 447 (1968);
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 458 (1968).
34. 391 U.S. at 439 (1968).
35. Id. at 441; Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
36. 391 U.S. at 439 (1968).
37. Id. at 441; Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 448 (1968); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 460 (1968). Due to the complexities of desegrega-
tion, the Court in Raney agreed with the judges of the Eighth Circuit, who in another
case held that the district courts "should retain -jurisdiction in school desegregation
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Until this decision, the United States Supreme Court had not ruled
on the adequacy of freedom-of-choice plans in achieving integration 38
Now that the Court has ruled, it would indeed appear that "[t]he
clock has ticked the last tick for tokenism and delay in the name of
'deliberate speed."39 The language of the Court strongly suggests
that any plan which places the responsibility of action upon the pupil
or the parent will no longer be tolerated. This is a significant step,
for no longer will a school board be able to draft a plan which on its
face promises desegregation, but because of social factors successfully
prevents it. Under freedom-of-choice a number of factors tended to
delay, if not to eliminate, any afrirmative action on the part of Negro
students or parents.40  Only Negroes of exceptional initiative and
fortitude would dare to risk the retaliation, economic reprisal, and
harassment that often occurred after the choice to attend a white
school had been made.41 This risk can be eliminated if the school
boards adopt plans that will not allow factors of physical and economic
suasion to be considered. The Court noted that one such solution
would be nonracial geographic zoning.42 Certainly such a solution
would eliminate many of the factors behind the adoption of freedom-
of-choice, if the zoning could be impartially accomplished so as not
to re-establish segregation.43 However, in areas where residential
segregation already exists, nonracial geographic zoning will accom-
plish little in terms of meaningful desegregation. Fortuitous segrega-
tion, due to the racial composition of neighborhoods, is often found
cases to insure (1) that a constitutionally acceptable plan is adopted, and (2) that it
is so operated in a constitutionally permissible fashion that the goal of a desegregated,
non-racially operated school system is rapidly and finally achieved." Kelly v. Altheimer,
378 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1967).
38. The Fourth Circuit had cited Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963),
as support for such plans. See also Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 318 (4th
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam).
39. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 896 (1966),
aff'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
40. A list of such factors has been formulated by the United States Commission on
Civil Rights. The Court neither adopted nor refused to adopt the Commission's
views. 391 U.S. 430, 440 n.5 (1968).
41. See DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 47-69.
42. This course of action was urged by Circuit Judge Sobeloff in his concurring
opinion in Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 332 (4th Cir. 1967). In
that case there was no residential segregation. In Moses v. Washington Parish School
Bd., 276 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. La. 1967), the court invalidated a freedom-of-choice
system and concluded that the schools should operate on the basis of a unitary system
of geographical attendance zones. The court said that freedom-of-choice systems had
been permitted only as an interim measure, and that once desegregation was accom-
plished the justification for that system was terminated.
43. In Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); the zoning had accom-
plished meaningful desegregation, but the free-transfer plan had destroyed its effect.
The district court had upheld the attendance-zone lines in Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 221 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Tenn. 1963).
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in the large metropolitan education complex, and is usually not due
to any gerrymandering or other discriminatory practices used by the
local school board. The Court in the instant case has expressly
avoided any reference to de facto segregation; indeed, the Court
speaks only to the removal of state-imposed segregation. But, in order
to obtain the Court's goal of "just schools," not white or Negro
schools, the language of the instant case suggests that solutions other
than zoning should be adopted when zoning does not result in de-
segregation, possibly including situations where segregation is de
facto. Thus, although other courts" have held that there is no con-
stitutional duty to bus Negro or white children out of their neighbor-
hoods, or to select new school sites in order to alleviate racial im-
balance,45 the Court's desire to dismantle segregated school systems
might very well make such solutions a possibility for the future.
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment
Entitles Defendants Charged with Serious
Crimes in State Courts to Trial by Jury
Appellant was convicted of simple battery' in a Louisiana state trial
court sitting without a jury, fined $150, and sentenced to 60 days in
the parish prison. Although subject to a possible maximum penalty
of two years imprisonment,2 appellant's request for trial by jury was
denied on the ground that the case did not meet the jury trial require-
ments established by the Louisiana Constitution.3 Appellant there-
44. Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 847 (1966); Coss v. Board of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
45. In the instant case the Court noted that one solution the school board could
take into consideration was the consolidation of the two schools, one site serving
grades 1-7 and the other serving grades 8-12. Although the school district involved
was not residentially segregated, the Court's acknowledgement of such a solution would
make the problem of new school sites much easier to effectuate. 391 U.S. at 442 n.6
(1968).
1. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:35 (1950): "Simple battery is a battery, without the consent
of the victim, committed without a dangerous weapon." The incident leading to the
trial occurred when appellant, a Negro, went to the aid of two younger cousins stopped
by four white boys on the side of a Louisiana highway. The four testified in court
that Duncan had slapped one of them on the arm as he hustled his cousins into his
car.
2. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:35 (1950): "Whoever commits a simple battery shall be
fined not more than three hundred dollars, or imprisoned for' not more than two years,
or both."
3. LA. CONST. art. vii, § 41, provides that only defendants subject to capital punish-
ment or imprisonment at hard labor are entitled to jury trials.
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after sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana claiming that
the denial of a jury trial violated his rights as guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of the United States. Finding no error in the trial judge's
ruling, the court denied certiorari.4 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. The right to trial by jury in serious
criminal cases is a fundamental right which must be accorded de-
fendants in state courts under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
The Supreme Court first considered the question of whether trial
by jury was required in state courts by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment almost one hundred years ago in the leading
case of Walker v. Sauvinet.5 In that case the issue before the Court
was the validity of a state law which allowed the trial judge to decide
a civil case when the jury was unable to agree on a verdict. In up-
holding this procedure the Court said by way of dictum that there
was no Constitutional right to jury trial in state courts. The Court
reaffirmed this stance by dicta in later cases involving civil trials.6
In Hallinger v. Davis7 the Court applied the same principle to a state
criminal proceeding, but once again the Court's pronouncement was
inconclusive since the precise issue was not raised.8 Criminal cases
following Hallinger also denied the Constitutional requirement of
jury trial but they, too, did not deal directly with the issue presented 9
in the instant case.10 In Palko v. Connecticut," for example, the
Court stated: "This Court has ruled that consistently with those
amendments [the sixth and seventh] trial by jury may be modified by
a state or abolished altogether."12 The precise issue before the Court
in Palko, however, was the validity of a Connecticut statute permitting
the state to take appeals in criminal cases. Most recently, in Irvin v.
Dowd,13 the Court cited Palko and Fay v. New York14 in acknowl-
edging the position it had taken on those earlier occasions. However,
4. 250 La. 253, 195 So. 2d 142 (1967).
5. 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
6. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923); New York Cent. R.R.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
7. 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
8. The case actually dealt with the constitutionality of a state's non-jury trial of a
defendant after the defendant had waived his right to jury trial. Id.
9. The Duncan Court characterized as dicta all of its prior statements regarding the
right to trial by jury in state courts. 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). See cases cited note 10
infra.
10. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261
(1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
11. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
12. Id. at 324.
13. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
14. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
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like its predecessors, Irvin did not deal with the precise issue raised
in Duncan.15 Since every state has provided for trial by jury in serious
criminal cases,'16 the issue presented in the instant case could only
arise when a conflict occurred between the existing state-guaranteed
right and the asserted constitutionally-guaranteed right.
In reaching its decision the Court returned to the basic position
that the fourteenth amendment requires the states to accord due
process of law to all persons within their jurisdictions and added that
the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Bights for interpretive
guidance in giving content to this constitutionally-imposed obligation.
Rejecting its own prior dicta,17 the Court reasoned that Bill of Rights
provisions which are "fundamental to the American scheme of jus-
tice"'8 are a part of the definition and content of due process. The
Court examined the long and vital role played by the jury in the
history of Anglo-American jurisprudence 19 and concluded that the
right to a jury in serious criminal cases2° is so fundamental that due
process requires its use in state courts. The Court conceded the
existence of a class of petty crimes outside the constitutional man-
date,21 but stated that in differentiating between petty and serious
offenses, the penalty authorized for a particular crime,2 as'well as
the existing laws and practices of the nation, must be considered as
determinative. Judged by these criteria, the Court held that a crime
punishable by as much as two years imprisonment23 is a serious crime
rather than a petty offense, and thereby entitles one who is so charged
15. The Court decided in Irvin that when a state uses juries it must insure that they
are impartial. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
16. 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
17. See cases cited note 10 supra.
18. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
19. See H. KALVEFN & H. ZEisEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); G. WILLIAMs, THE
PROOF OF GuiLT 271-79 (1963). But see J. FRANK, CotMTs ON TRIAL (1949);
G. W=Ams, supra at 236-43 (1963); Broeder, The Functions of the-Jury: Fact or
Fiction? 21 U. Car. L. REv. 386 (1954); Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American
jury, 13 U. MicH. L. REv. 302 (1915). See also SOURCES OF Oua LmERTIES (R. Perry
ed. 1959).
20. Louisiana argued that the Court should look to the penalty imposed rather than
that authorized in determining whether or not the crime is a serious one. This argu-
ment was made successfully in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), where
the defendant was jailed for contempt without benefit of a jury trial. The Duncan
Court distinguished Cheff on the ground that in contempt cases no maximum sentence
is authorized by statute and that therefore the penalty actually imposed is the best
evidence of the seriousness of the crime. Accord, Illinois v. Bloom, 391 U.S. 194
(1968) (decided with the instant case).
21. Other dissents were written by Justices Harlan and Stewart. All dissenters
300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana,
139 U.S. 621 (1891).
22. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
23. See note 2 supra.
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to trial by jury as a matter of right. In a concurring opinion24 Justice
Black reiterated his familiar view that the fourteenth amendment in-
corporates all of the Bill of Rights protections against state action.
He approved the majority's tacit selective incorporation approach,
since it, like his view, has the virtue of confining judges to the Bill
of Rights in deciding what state practices are desirable and what are
not.2
The Court's decision represents a further development of two of
its current trends. Generally, the right to trial by jury in all serious
crimes in state courts was added to an expanding list of individual
rights protected against state infringement by the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 More specifically, the Court continued the extension of the
right to trial by jury into areas heretofore considered exempt from
the constitutional requirement.2 7  But in using the phrase "funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice" the Court apparently re-
worded its current test for determining the applicability of Bill of
Rights guarantees against the states. a However, it is doubtful that
this change of wording will affect future decisions, since the various
phrasings seem to amount to substantially the same requirement.
29
While the wording of the test may not be of particular significance
when compared with the other tests the Court has used,30 it may
mark the beginning of a trend toward more facile incorporation
through greater emphasis on the asserted right and less emphasis
upon the formulation of the test. In any case, the unmistakable di-
24. 391 U.S. at 162. Justice Douglas joined in the opinion.
25. In a dissenting opinion Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, renewed his
debate with Justice Black and the Court majority regarding the validity of selective
and total incorporation theories for extending the Bill of Rights against the states.
391 U.S. at 171. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Fortas expressed disagree-
ment with the implication in the majority opinion that all of the Court's decisions with
respect to the sixth amendment and federal jury trials might be applicable to the
states. Id. at 211. Compare Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. RyEv. 5 (1949), with
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial
Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). See generally Jaffe, Was Brandeis an
Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HAnv. L. R.v. 986 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation of opposing
witnesses); Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination).
27. E.g., United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
28. Since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court had applied this
test: whether the asserted right was "a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."
Earlier the Court had worded it: "basic in our system of jurisprudence." In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).




rection of the present Court is toward incorporation rather than ex-
clusion, regardless of what reasoning is used to determine which rights
are fundamental. Despite the contemporary and future significance
of this trend, the immediate impact of the Duncan decision is of little
consequence, since only three of the fifty states impose prison sentences
of more than six months without granting jury trials.31 As a result,
the major importance of Duncan may be that it heralds a gradual re-
evaluation of the whole class of offenses designated as "petty." Re-
gardless of what sentence may be imposed, many offenses now classi-
fied as petty may in the future be upgraded to require jury trial as
"serious" crimes. Gradual redefinition of petty crimes would, in itself,
bring the right to jury trial to a whole group of offenders not now
entitled to this procedure.2 This method of extension of the jury
trial right is suggested by Duncan, but the Court did not attempt to
provide any specific guidance for differentiating between petty and
serious offenses.33 Rather than develop this distinction on a case-by-
case basis, the Court may well eliminate it entirely and hold that
defendants subject to any imprisonment are entitled to juries. This
approach would be a distinct break with both history and precedent,
34
but it could reflect a changed value judgment that the social stigma
attached to incarceration ought not to be imposed by any means other
than a jury. Nevertheless, whichever approach the Court adopts
when confronted with the issue in the future, its decisions could cause
a complete revamping of the administration of the criminal process
in the states,3 as well as considerable congestion and docket back-
logs.3 Ironically, this congestion could result in an indigent defendant
spending more time in pre-trial confinement waiting for his jury trial
on a minor offense than could have been imposed against him under
the maximum sentence for the offense. Waiver of trial by jury is
obviously no answer, for such a procedure could in effect obliterate
31. Louisiana, New Jersey and New York. 391 U.S. 145, 161 n.33 (1968).
32. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Offenses & the Constitutional Guarantee of
Trial by Jury, 39 HAnv. L. REV. 917 (1926); Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!
26 U. Cm. L. REv. 245 (1959).
33. At one point in its opinion the Court stated that the fourteenth amendment
guarantees the sixth amendment right to trial by jury in state courts in all cases where
that right would exist were they to be tried in federal courts. 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968). In federal courts petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more
than six months in prison and a $500 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). However, it is
unclear what the Court meant by the above statement, since it declined to apply the
six month limitation to definitions of state petty crimes. Perhaps the Court was tacitly
indicating that its holding is founded upon the familiar selective incorporation theory.
34.. See cases cited note 21 supra.
35. See Desmond, Current Problems of State Court Administration, 65 CoLumr. L.
REV. 561 (1965).
36. See Tauro, Congestion in the Courts, 49 MAss. L.Q. 171 (1964).
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the constitutional right to trial by jury where deals are offered with
a view to alleviating court congestion. On the other hand, if such a
situation should occur, it might be just the impetus needed to pro-
duce other reforms, such as in the area of bail bonds for those who
cannot now even "buy" their pre-trial freedom.
Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-"One Man,
One Vote" Held Applicable to Units of
Local Government
Petitioner, a resident and voter of Midland County, Texas, filed
suit against respondents, Midland County and its commissioners court,'
alleging malapportionment of the four electoral districts from which
the members of the court were elected. Petitioner contended that
the apportionment scheme2 then in effect violated the Texas Consti-
tution3 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The trial court found for petitioner,4 and respondent appealed. The
1. According to one source the court was the general governing body of the county
with such enumerated duties as establishing a courthouse and jail, appointing numerous
minor officials like the county health officer, letting county contracts, administering
welfare services, building roads and bridges, setting tax rates, and issuing bonds.
Interpretative Commentary, VEaNoN's ANN. TEx. CoNsT., art. 5, § 18 (1955). The
effect of the authority actually exercised by the court had its greatest significance in the
rural districts. The Texas Supreme Court determined that the court was only theo-
retically the governing body of the entire county because the court's major responsibilities
were to the non-urban areas of the county. The court viewed themselves as primarily
road commissioners for the rural districts and maintained no streets within the city.
Furthermore, the city had a mayor and council for its urban affairs. The county elected
at-large a tax assessor and collector, county attorney, sheriff, treasurer, county clerk
and surveyor. It was reported that of all the elected officials in the county, only 3
resided outside the city limits.
2. In 1963 Midland County had a population of about 70,000. The county was
divided into 4 districts with sizes of 67,906; 852; 414; and 828. The city of Midland
was the urban center of the county and located almost entirely in the first district
which had 97% of the county's population and almost the same percentage of the
county's qualified voters. Also in 1963 the commissioners court, which consisted of a
county judge, elected at-large, and 4 other members selected from each district, ordered
a redistricting of the county. Three of the four resultant districts were rural, and
each district had the right to elect one commissioner to the court irrespective of its
size; therefore, the rural populace had the greater share of representation on tho
court. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).
3. VERNON's ANN. TEx. CoNsT. art. 1, §§ 3, 19; art. 5, § 18 (1955). Section 3 of
art. 1 was commonly referred to as the equal protection clause.
4. The trial court set aside the order which had apportioned Midland County into
the districts on the ground that the order was arbitrary and invidiously discriminatory
and ordered a redistricting on the basis of equal population. Midland County v. Avery,
397 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the ground that no federal
or state law required the districts to be equal in population,5 and
petitioner appealed. The Texas Supreme Court, reversing both lower
courts, held that the redistricting order was arbitrary and thus violative
of the equal protection clause and the state constitution.6 However,
the court noted that neither the state constitution nor the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment required the districts to
be apportioned on a strict population basis.7 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, vacated and remanded. The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the
application of the "one man, one vote" principle to apportionment
plans for local electoral districts charged with electing members to
local governmental units exercising general powers over the entire
community. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
In 1962 the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr,8 overruling strong
precedent, 9 and held that the question of legislative district appoint-
ment was not a mere "politicar question, but instead presented a
justiciable question under the equal protection clause. Building
upon that decision, the Court held in Reynolds v. Sims'0 that state
legislative districts were subject to the mandate, although conceding
that rational deviation from a strict population standard could be
permitted when other factors warranted it. The principle of Reynolds
has, through subsequent litigation, been used in attempts to apportion
units of local government with varying degrees of success, usually
depending upon the type of government unit involved. Although
some state courts have applied the "one man, one vote" principle
to local units," federal courts have disagreed as to which govern-
5. The state constitution required only a division of the counties "from time to time
for the convenience of the people . . . into four commissioners precincts." VERNON'S
ANN. TEx. CoNsT. art. 5, § 18 (1955).
6. Although the court held that no population disparity was sustainable against the
arbitrariness reflected in the districts' patent malapportionment plan, it noted that the
"convenience of the people" may require a variance from the equal population
standard when other relevant factors are considered; i.e., number of qualified voters,
land areas, geography, miles of county roads, and taxation values. Avery v. Midland
County, 406 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. 1966).
7. The court noted that the legislative functions of the commissioners courts are
negligible "and county government is not otherwise comparable to the legislature of
a state or . . . Congress where the 'one man, one vote' principle is asserted in its
most exacting and compelling sense." 406 S.W.2d at 426. Before this reference to
Reynolds, the issues did not appear to be based specifically on the "one man, one
vote" principle.
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Supervisors,. 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857,
46 Cal, Rptr. 617 (1965); Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222
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mental subdivisions were subject. Thus, the principle has been held
applicable to municipal governments12 and inapplicable to local judi-
cial bodies.13 In certain instances the "one man, one vote" principle
has been extended to county government units14 and special-function
units, 5 while in other instances, application was denied.16 In the
recent case of Sailors v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court
avoided making a determinative statement of the limits of the doc-
trine, holding only that an essentially administrative body, chosen by
a method essentially appointive, was exempt. Thus, because the issue
has not been squarely presented, the Court has not held as a matter
of law that even purely legislative local bodies must be equally ap-
portioned, although one case assumed in dictum that such was the
law.' 8
A.2d 164 (1966); Armentrout v. Schooler, 409 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1966); Seaman v.
Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
13. See New York State Association of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp.
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ga. 1964). The
basis of these decisions was that unlike legislatures, judicial bodies are not responsible
for achieving representative government.
14. See, e.g., Dyer v. Rich, 259 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (applied to county
board of supervisors).
15. See Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
(interim school board where the court noted that a local school district was an arm
of the state legislature to administer its educational system and was therefore not
immune to constitutional requirements).
16. Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Johnson v. Genesee County, 232 F. Supp. 567
(E.D. Mich. 1964) (the court determined that the power of the state and its
agencies over municipal corporations within its territories is not restrained by the
fourteenth amendment). Cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township School Dist.
No. 3, 247 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 378 F.2d 225
(6th Cir. 1967).
17. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967). The statute challenged pro-
vided that county board members were to be chosen by delegates %vho were appointed
by locally elected county school boards. The Court did not decide whether a local
legislative body could be validly appointed. It did note that the Constitution permitted
non-legislative officers to be selected by an appointive process or a combination of
election and appointment. But the Court assumed arguendo that when a state provides
for an elective process to select local officials who perform administrative, legislative,
or judicial functions, "one man, one vote' applied. For a more extensive analysis of
the case, see 21 VAim. L. REv. 153 (1967).
18. See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), where the Court assumed that the
apportionment of local units was governed by Reynolds but held that the local appor.
tionment plan challenged did not indicate discrimination, which must be present in
order to invoke the Reynolds principle. In Dusch, a so-called "Seven-Four" plan
created seven boroughs which varied substantially in population. The city council
consisted of 11 members, each of whom was elected at-large. Four were elected
without regard to residence and the 7 other members were required to reside in
different boroughs. Bayside borough, with 29,048 residents, thus bad the same assured
representation as Blackwater borough, with 733 residents. The Court determined
that the boroughs were used only as a basis of residence for the candidates and not
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The Court in the instant case determined that the fourteenth amend-
ment applied to the exercise of state power however manifested,
whether directly or through subordinate agencies. Reasoning that
local government units are to be regarded as subordinate agencies
of a state, the Court concluded that if the fourteenth amendment
required state legislatures to be elected from equally populated dis-
tricts, it also required members of local governmental units to be
selected on the same basis. Addressing the contention that the com-
missioners court was a non-legislative and specialized unit, the Court
noted that no particular classification would adequately define the
court's function; the critical factor was that the court exercised "gen-
eral powers," in that it had authority to make decisions affecting all
the citizens of the county which it represented 19 notwithstanding the
court's disproportionate rural interest. Therefore, the Court found that
each county resident had the constitutional right to have his vote
weigh equally with other residents' votes.20 In his dissenting opinion
Mr. Justice Fortas reasoned that a strict application of the "one man,
one vote" principle was impractical due to the complexities of local
government structure. He stated that the equal protection clause
did not demand a strict application of the Reynolds principle, because
an inflexible application of that principle ignored the fact that many
local functions which are limited and specialized have an unequal
impact on the constituents. Determining that the commissioners court
in the instant case was a special-purpose unit with limited powers
and functions which were oriented toward the rural population in
Midland County and not toward the urban population which had
another governing body to manage its governmental affairs, Justice
Fortas concluded that it would debase the substantive equality of
the rural person's vote if it were mechanically equalized with that
of the urban voter since the rural person had the greater interest in
the court.'
as a voting base, since each councilman represented not only his borough but the
city at-large.
19. The Court referred to the authority as being "general power" and responsibility
for local affairs. The Court determined that a decision not to exercise functional power
affected all residents as much as an affirmative exercise. It relied heavily on evidence
of the court's taxing and bond-issuing power. A dissenting opinion determined that
these functions were extremely limited or within the control of the county at-large.
See VERNON'S ANN. TEX. CoNsT. art. 8, § 9; and 7 VFRNON'S ANN. TEX. Civ. STAT. art.
2352 (1964).
20. The Court emphasized that it was not deterring the efficiency or experimental
processes of local governmental units by requiring the equal protection standard. See
Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 111 (1967), where the Court previously had
emphasized the flexibility needed by local units to meet changing urban conditions.
21. Other dissents were written by Justices Harlan and Stewart. All dissenters
thought the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted because the Texas Supreme
Court's decision lacked finality in that the commissioners court could redistrict after
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The instant case does not unequivocally resolve the question whether
all elective units of local government are governed by the "one man,
one vote" standard. However, it does indicate that the Court will
look to the extent of the authority granted to and exercised by a local
unit and not to functional classifications such as "legislative" and"administrative" in determining whether malapportionment exists.
Now the "one man, one vote" standard will be applicable to a local
unit if it exercises "general powers" over the area it serves.22 Two
dissenters persuasively pointed out that irrespective of the scope of
the authority granted to a local unit, the "general power" standard
ignored the reality of the functioning process of special-purpose
units2 which concentrate on the needs of certain constituents more
than others. While these dissenters concluded that the court was a
special-purpose unit, the majority recognized the existence of special-
purpose units,24 but stated that that concept was not before them
because the commissioners court exercised "general powers."2 It is
submitted that if legitimate exceptions to strict populations standard
are constitutionally permissible as the Reynolds opinion indicated,
2 7
the facts of the instant case warranted a determination that the court
was a special-purpose unit, and therefore, such an exception should
have been adopted. The Court, however, found the facts appropriate
for espousing the new "general powers" test, which makes the "one
the decision was rendered and could comply with apportionment requirements without
need for the Court's intervention. The dissenting Justices did consider the merits
of the case, however, to reply to the majority. Mr. Justice Harlan noted that practical
necessity did not justify application of the "one man, one vote" principle as it did in
Baker v. Carr, because the state legislature or a constitutional amendment could provide
adequate redress. Like Mr. Justice Fortas, he determined that the "one man, one vote"
ideology was not acceptable for structuring local government units and therefore con-
cluded that an extension of the Reynolds standard in any form to local units was
inappropriate. He emphasized that local government structuring was the responsibility
,of the local political processes. Mr. Justice Stewart stated that he would have joined
Mr. Justice Fortas' opinion had the latter not endorsed the Reynolds principle.
22. See note 19 and supra, accompanying text.
23. See, Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties
and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 21, 32-3 (1965). The
author notes as criteria for determining whether the unit is special-functioning: (1)
how many functions the unit has; (2) whether the unit is reasonably designed to
achieve an end appropriate for a special-function unit, i.e., water supply, sewage dis-
posal, or other special services; and (3) how well the representational formula for
selecting members of the unit reflects population. Professor Weinstein believes that
a rough approximation should be valid for special units. Accepting the "special pur-
pose" aspects of the instant case, perhaps the Court would have been more hesitant
to act had the population disparity been less drastic.
24. 390 U.S. at 483-84.
25. Therefore, the Court could not have intended their holding to apply to special-
purpose units, since that issue was not before the Court. Id. at 484.
26. But see Id. at 504 (Fortas, J., dissenting) and note 1 supra.
27. 377 U.S. at 579.
man, one vote" principle more broadly applicable at the local govern-
ment level.2 Unquestionably the application of the principle would
have been more defensible if the Court had waited for a case in
which the local unit did, in fact, affect equally the constituents it
represented; as Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent points out, however, the
commissioners court was not such a unit. Thus, while espousing a
"general power" test, it is apparent that, in substance, the instant
decision extends the Reynolds principle in a mechanical manner to
a unit which in reality did not exercise general powers.2 Conse-
quently, the Court's decision may conceivably have the effect of
making equally populated voting districts a requirement for all units
of local government. Reverting to Sailors, legislative bodies could be
made subject under Reynolds, while administrative bodies could be
made subject under the instant decision, regardless of the method of
choosing the office-holders. It remains to be seen whether this possi-
ble effect was the real intent of the Court, or whether, in its zeal to
bring the majority of local governing units within the scope of the
"one man, one vote" principle, the Court merely gave an unduly
strained interpretation of its new test in an attempt to fit it to an
unsuitable factual situation.
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Police May
Conduct Limited Search for Weapons in Course
of Field Investigation Without Probable
Cause for Arrest
Petitioner was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon after a
police detective who had observed petitioner and two other men
making repeated reconnaissances of a store window approached them,
asked their names, and arrested the three after patting down the pe-
28. The Court indicated in Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 111 (1967), that the
fourteenth amendment requirement was applicable to all local units whose officials
were selected by an elective process. Since almost all local officials are elected, it
would appear that the only method available to avoid the "one man, one vote" principle
is appointing the officials. However, as the Sailors case noted, difficulty may arise in
the appointment of a legislative official. It is clear now that emphasis will not be
placed on the nature of an official's duty. The Court will consider the nature of the
local unit instead of the nature of duties performed by those composing the unit.
Thus the duty classifications of the Sailors case have been replaced by a unit classifica-
tion of "general power."
29. If the Court can justifiably conclude that the commissioners court exercised
"general powers" when its rural orientation was obvious, it would appear that for
any future local unit to qualify as special purpose in character, the proof required will
be exacting as to specialized structure, statutory authority, and constituent impact.
11091968] RECENT CASES
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
titioner's clothing and finding a gun in his overcoat.1 Petitioner moved
before trial to suppress the gun as evidence on the ground that the
arrest was illegal. The trial court rejected the prosecution's claim that
the gun was seized incident to a lawful arrest, but denied petitioner's
motion, holding that the detective had made a permissible stop, rather
than an arrest, and an essential self-protective frisk for weapons, rather
than a search, upon reasonable cause to believe that the petitioner was
armed. The Court of Appeals, Eighth Judicial Circuit, Cuyahoga
County, affirmed the conviction, adopting the reasoning of the trial
court and adding that the detective, having found the gun by a valid
frisk, then had probable cause to make the arrest, which occurred
only after he removed petitioner from the street.2 The Supreme Court
of Ohio, finding no substantial constitutional question to be involved,
dismissed petitioner's appeal. On certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, held, affirmed. The fourth amendment permits a police
officer who has a reasonable suspicion, not amounting to probable
cause, that an individual is engaging in criminal activity and is armed
and presently dangerous, to make a carefully limited search of the
suspect's outer clothing for weapons, and any weapons found will
be admissible in evidence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Exceptions to the fourth amendment requirement of a warrant for
a search or seizure form the basis of the law of arrest.3 Generally, an
1. The detective, an experienced officer assigned to patrol for shoplifters and pick-
pockets, watched petitioner and a second man strolling back and forth on the street,
repeatedly looking into the same store window, conferring with each other on the
corner and with another man who left and rejoined the two in front of the window
immediately before the detective approached. He testified that he suspected that they
were "casing a job, a stick-up" and feared that they were armed. Feeling it was his
duty to investigate, he approached them and patted down petitioner after his questions
elicited mumbled responses. The detective took all three men into the store where
he removed Terry's overcoat in order to retrieve the pistol from the pocket and where
he searched the others. Richard Chilton, Terry's codefendant, was also carrying a gun,
but the third man was not. After separate trials, Chilton and Terry made joint state
court appeals and petitions for certiorari, but since Chilton died before the granting
of the writ, the Court reviewed only Terry's conviction. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5
n.2, 6-7 (1968).
2. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). Petitioner had
argued on appeal that, despite a right of inquiry, the arrest had occurred at the initial
questioning, and there being no probable cause at that time, the guns were inadmis-
sible under the exclusionary rule of Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 5 Ohio App.
2d at 127, 214 N.E.2d at 118. It should be noted that, according to the Supreme
Court, during the frisk the detective had felt the gun, which was inside Terry's
overcoat, but was not able to retrieve it until after removing Terry's coat inside the
store. It is not clear from the record that the detective immediately recognized the
object through the garment as being a gun and thus "found" it by a frisk. The Ohio
court said that the detective removed the gun while on the street before arresting
Terry, 5 Ohio App. at 124, 214 N.E.2d at 116, but the Supreme Court reported that
the removal was inside the store. 392 U.S. at 7.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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arrest may be made without a warrant when the officer has probable
cause to believe that an offense has been or is being committed in his
presence,4 and a reasonable search may be made without a warrant
when incident to a lawful arrest,5 or when delay in obtaining a warrant
might cause the loss of evidence.6 These broad exceptions have been
restricted and confined. Though the fourth amendment forbids only
unreasonable searches, 7 a search reasonable at its inception may vio-
late the fourth amendment by reason of its unnecessary scope and
degree.8 The Supreme Court has consistently held that, whenever
practicable, police must obtain warrants for searches and seizures,9
and a failure to do so is excused only in extreme circumstances.' 0
Moreover, in order to deter unlawful police conduct, evidence ob-
tained by unlawful searches has been declared inadmissible in fed-
eral" and state12 courts. Police practices in the field, particularly the
so-called "stop and frisk," have engendered a controversy over the
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
tirings to be seized."
4. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1961). The requirement of probable
cause for an arrest without a warrant is one of the most elusive problems in criminal
law. It has been defined as facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer
warranting a prudent man in believing that an offense has been or was being com-
mitted. Id. at 102. The Court has also spoken of reasonably trustworthy information
and facts sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that
an offense has been committed. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
5. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1961).
6. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). In Carroll the Court,
reviewing convictions under the National Prohibition Act, Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch.
134, 42 Stat. 222, eased the restrictions on searches involving contraband in a moving
vehicle, holding that probable cause to believe that a vehicle contained contraband
subject to seizure made the search and seizure valid even though not incident to a
lawful arrest; cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
7. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) (removal of entire
contents of cabin where petitioners were arrested was an illegal search and seizure); cf.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (scope of search must be strictly justified
by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible) (Fortas, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (moving vehicle); cf. Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (1948) (seizure of contraband incident to a lawful arrest held illegal
where no excuse shown for the failure to obtain a warrant). But cf. United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), where the Court said that officers having time to
secure a search warrant were not bound to do so, the search being otherwise reasonable.
11. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). See also People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 759, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955), where the California Supreme Court held that
since the exclusionary rule is intended to deter unlawful police activities, evidence
illegally obtained would be excluded regardless of whether it was obtained in violation
of the particular defendant's rights.
1968 ] IIII
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
extent of the officer's authority to detain and search an individual
with less than probable cause to arrest. Proponents of flexible police
procedures view the stop and frisk as an essential law enforcement
procedure that can be distinguished from arrest and search made upon
probable cause;13 opponents, demanding strict adherence to the fourth
amendment, require probable cause sufficient for an arrest at the initial
encounter before a search of any kind may be made.14 The Supreme
Court has never expressly distinguished between an investigatory stop
and an arrest. The right of a policeman to stop an individual for in-
terrogation upon less than probable cause has been fairly established
in state and lower federal courts,15 however, and the Supreme Court
seems to have acknowledged this right as a necessary incident of
competent police investigation.'6 Where weapons or contraband found
in a search incident to such an encounter have been in issue, the courts
have reached various decisions on the legality of the stop and search,
depending on the circumstances of each case. In Rios v. United
States.17 the Supreme Court suggested that evidence taken from a
suspect would be admissible only if there were probable cause for
an arrest at the time of the initial encounter. Moreover, in Henry v.
United States'8 the Court, viewing any forcible detention as a consti-
tutionally regulated arrest, seemed to require probable cause for all
physical interferences with the person beyond questioning. Several
state courts have allowed limited self-protective searches for weapons
during investigatory stops upon reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity. 9 In permitting such intrusions without probable cause to
13. See generally Comment, 65 CoLUmi. L. REV. 848 (1965).
14. See generally 41 So. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1968).
15. E.g., Keiningham v. United States, 307 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied
371 U.S. 948 (1963) (questioning of suspicious individual warranted without probable
cause); United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), re'd on other
grounds sub nora. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960) (not every
detention of the person is a seizure under the fourth amendment); People v. Jones,
176 Cal. App. 2d 265, 1 Cal. Rptr. 210 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (police officer has
right to make inquiry of persons on public street at night).
16. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); cf. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 179 (1949) (Burton, J., concurring).
17. 364 U.S. 253 (1960); cf. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (once
there is probable cause for an arrest it is immaterial that a search (without a warrant)
precedes the arrest).
18. 361 U.S. 98 (1959). The Court seemed to adopt a tort definition of arrest: any
interference with liberty, however slight. See W. PnossEa, ToTs § 12, at 58 (3d ed.
1964); cf. United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959) (defendant
arrested when asked to accompany policeman to a call box); United States v. Scott,
149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957) (restraint of full liberty); cf. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (fourth amendment not to be measured in terms
of niceties of tort law). But see Clark, J., dissenting, in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 104 (1959).
19. E.g., People v. Michelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964). The right is obvious
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support an arrest, some of the cases distinguished between a frisk
for weapons and a general search, finding the former to be outside
the scope of the fourth amendment.20 Although a groundless search
is unlawful and evidence seized therein inadmissible,21 the scope of
a permitted search for weapons and the admissibility of evidence
other than weapons discovered incident to such a search have been
unsettled problems. One view is that while the initial stop was with-
out probable cause, if it were justifiable as a proper investigation
such evidence as might be found in a subsequent search for weapons
might constitute probable cause for an arrest and would be admis-
sible.22 The opposite view holds that the legality of the search con-
ducted after questioning depends on whether there was probable
cause for a technical arrest at the initial encounter, but this view
perhaps disregards the idea of a self-protective search as necessary.2
3
In the instant case, the Court found that the narrow question for
decision was "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to
seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons un-
less there is probable cause for an arrest."2 Noting that the entire
variety of police field practices could never be regulated by applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule,5 the Court reasoned that the public
interest in effective law enforcement justified some authority of a
police officer, in appropriate circumstances, to approach an individual
and investigate his suspicious conduct without having probable cause
for arrest, and in this respect, the detective's conduct in approaching
the petitioner and his companions was entirely proper. Noting that
criminal violence has caused the deaths of many policemen, the
Court found it unreasonable to prohibit an officer who is justified in
when the search is incident to a lawful arrest. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
367 (1964).
20. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114
(1966), aff'd, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21. E.g., People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955).
22. Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469 (1959); People v. Faginkrantz, 21 IlM. 2d
75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1961); cf. Keiningham v. United States, 307 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 948 (1963).
23. Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
998 (1959).
24. 392 U.S. at 15.
25. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to enforce constitutional safeguards against
police by excluding the fruits of unlawful searches in prosecutions; police conduct not
directed at prosecution cannot be deterred by the rule. Id. at 12, 13 & n.9.
26. The Court here seems to have accepted the right of the police to approach an
individual without probable cause to be grounded in public policy, for no authority is
cited. Others have been unwilling to make this categorical statement without authority.
See the discussion of the point in State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d
114 (1966).
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suspecting that his subject is armed to remove the threat of harm
by searching the person. The Court held that this self-protective
measure involved a constitutionally governed search and seizure, thus
rejecting arguments that sought to take the practice outside the scope
of the fourth amendment. The Court argued, however, that since the
brief, though serious, intrusion of a search for weapons is not the
equivalent of an arrest2 7 and serves different interests, the consti-
tutional standard for this conduct is not probable cause, but rather
reasonableness 2 8 determined by balancing the governmental interest
in making the search against the citizen's interest in being free from
intrusion. The proper balance between the interest of police in self-
protection and the freedom of the individual requires, said the Court,
that the police officer be permitted to make a limited search for
weapons regardless of whether he has probable cause for an arrest.
The officer must have a reasonable belief that the suspect is both
engaged in criminal activity and armed. The belief must be based
on "the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience"'' and must continue after
the initial encounter. Concluding that the specific limitations to be
placed upon the search for weapons will be developed case by case,
the Court held generally that the search must be reasonably confined
to the purpose of protecting the officer and that the instant detective's
search of petitioner did not violate this standard.
30
27. 392 U.S. at 24, 25. Here the Court refers to an arrest as the initiation of a
criminal prosecution. Search incident to arrest has always been partly justified by the
necessity of protecting the officer from assaults, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964), but is to be distinguished from the limited search because it may involve
a more exhaustive search for contraband or other evidence of crime.
28. The Court characterized this sort of police conduct as "necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant proce-
dure." 392 U.S. at 20; cf. cases cited in note 4, supra.
29. 392 U.S. at 27.
30. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, found that the right to frisk implies a pre-cxisting
right to make a forcible stop, for which there must he a constitutional basis. Since
the State of Ohio has not provided statutory authority for the right to stop and since
a citizen may ordinarily refuse to be searched by the officer, the right to stop must arise
from the necessity of the situation in which the officer has a reasonable suspicion in
light of his experience that the person is about to engage in crime. The right to frisk,
he felt, automatically followed the justified forcible stop. Mr. Justice White also con-
curred, saying that in special circumstances a person may be detained, the frisk being
justified by the circumstances of the detention. Even if weapons are not found, he
concluded, constitutional rights are not violated if pertinent questions are asked. Mr.
Justice Black concurred with the result, but excepted to the parts supported by Katz v.
United States and the concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the holding, in abandoning the
standard of probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, in the last analysis gave
the police in the street greater power to intrude lawfully upon the privacy of the
individual than a judge could authorize when asked for a warrant. This inroad on
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Having devoted many opinions to protecting the- integrity of the
individual, the Court in Terry has struck an expedient compromise
between society's interest in effective law enforcement and the inno-
cent citizen's interest in being free of governmental interference.
Whereas convictions based on evidence obtained without a warrant
previously turned on the existence of probable cause, courts may now
also apply a standard of reasonable suspicion that the subject was
armed and in the course of criminal activity in order to uphold a
search. While the decision recognizes that necessity and the public
interest require that the police be allowed to detain and question
persons found in suspicious circumstances and require that innocent
citizens yield to such necessity even to the point of a humiliating
public frisk, it also makes greater demands on the common sense
and professionalism of the police officer in the field. The new stan-
dard of police conduct will be no more nor less difficult to apply than
that of probable cause; however, in light of the complexity of human
behavior and the events which confront policemen, it would be diffi-
cult to fashion a more useful and positive test. In reality, the decision
is unlikely to cause any major changes in police attitudes or behavior.
Courts can regulate the practices of stop and frisk only to the extent
that abuses become visible through litigation. The requirement of
reasonableness will not curb harrassment or aggressive patrols not
intended to produce prosecutions any more than would the strict
application of the exclusionary rule.3' It seems likely, however, that
possible misconstruction of the rule in Terry as affording to police a
license to continue abusive field interrogations will have incendiary
results in communities where such practices are already a "'major
source of friction between the police and minority groups."' 32
In the area of legitimate operations under Terry, the Court at
present will not allow the limited search to go beyond the require-
ments of disarming the subject; thus the rule of Terry should not
come to replace the requirement for a warrant or probable cause in
order to search for evidence for a prosecution. 3 The decision does
judicial supervision of the requirement of probable cause, he felt, was a serious step
that should be based only upon deliberate amendment of the Constitution.
31. 392 U.S. at 14.
32. PRsIDENT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTICE, TAsic FORCE REPORTs: THE POLICE (1967), cited in 392 U.S. at 14 n.11.
33. Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), two cases
consolidated and decided with Terry, illustrate how the Court is likely to apply the
rule in Terry. In Sibron, defendant was arrested after a policeman had observed his
conversations with known narcotics dealers, asked him to leave a restaurant, put his
hand in defendant's pocket, and found a quantity of heroin. In Peters, defendant was
arrested by a policeman who bad startled him moving furtively in the hallway outside
his apartment. A search produced a packet of burglary tools. The conviction in Sibron
was reversed because the officer had neither probable cause to arrest nor reasonable
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create some uncertainty about the permissible scope of the search,
however. Reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed must con-
tinue after the initial encounter in order to justify the search. Since
protection of the officer is the only justification for the search, it
should be limited to a patting down of the suspect's outer clothes.
If no weapons are felt in the clothes, no further search would be
justified unless an arrest is made. Since the Court uses the term
"search" rather than the familiar word "frisk," which connotes a patting
down, it is not clear whether an officer may actually enter a suspect's
pockets when he feels something in them that arouses his suspicion.
This issue will arise when an officer, meeting all the requirements of
reasonableness under Terry, reaches into the suspect's pocket and
finds, not a weapon, but rather contraband or other evidence of
crime. Since the admissibility of the object will turn on the reason-
ableness of the search, the courts should not view as reasonable an
intrusion beyond a patting down unless the evidence is very strong
that the officer continued to believe that the object he felt was a
weapon. The Court, in failing to delineate clearly the steps of a
reasonable self-protective search, has left the initial determination to
trial courts where pressure for convictions may encourage relaxation of
the requirement of reasonable suspicion.3 4 The legislatures in some
states, particularly New York, have already determined prior to the
instant case that any object, the possession of which is unlawful, found
in a limited search may be the ground for an arrest, without setting
any standards of reasonableness for the search.s Even though a
limited search for weapons is now deemed a reasonable intrusion, it
suspicion that the defendant was armed under Terry. In Peters, the conviction was
affirmed because the policeman had ample probable cause to believe that the defendant
had committed or was about to commit a crime.
34. See Worthy v. United States, 3 Cumi. L. REP. 2448 (D.C. Cir. August 8, 1968),
where a conviction for possession of heroin was affirmed and a search of a vagrant
was upheld as being incident to arrest for vagrancy, although the crime of vagrancy
has no fruit or instrumentality. "Since the search was for a weapon, the seizure of
the narcotics, though not a weapon, was lawful and this contraband accordingly was
useable [sic] as evidence." In a dissent, Wright, J., adopted the language of Mr.
Justice Harlan in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), in stating: "[Elven if
the police had reasonable grounds to suspect a narcotics offense, even a limited search
for weapons might be unconstitutional because the 'nature of the suspected offense
creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety.'"
35. N.Y. CODE CPRIM. P. § 180-a (MeKinney Supp. 1967) provides: "1. A police
officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects
is commiting, has committed, or is about to commit a felony or any of the crimes
specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
"2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this
section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such
person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other
thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until
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should not be permitted to be substituted through such legislation for
a constitutional search upon probable cause when circumstances re-
quire the latter.
A concomitant area of uncertainty in the decision concerns the
permitted scope of forcible detainer without probable cause for pur-
poses other than a self-protective search. Although the Court dis-
claims any decision of the issue, it is arguable that the holding of
Te'ry impliedly permits police to seize a person for temporary de-
tention and/or questioning under the standard of reasonableness.3 7
It should be made clear that the forcible seizure allowed in Terry is
for the protection of the officer in specific circumstances only, and,
like the search for weapons, must not become a general substitute for
traditional constitutional procedures in the field practices of police.
Hopefully, the Court will make this view clear at the first opportunity.
Landlord-Tenant-Violation of Housing Regulations
Renders Lease Agreement Unenforceable in Action
for Possession and Nonpayment of Rent
Appellee, a landlord, brought an action for possession against the
appellant tenant for non-payment of rent.J The tenant contended that
the landlord had let the dwelling knowing that its condition violated
the District of Columbia Housing Regulation,2 and that the lease
agreement was, therefore, unenforceable as an illegal contract. The
General Sessions Court gave judgment for the landlord. On appeal to
the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully
possessed, or arrest such person."
36. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
37. Cf. Harlan, J., concurring, Id. at 31-34.
1. The tenant had already vacated the premises, but brought this appeal because
the trial court's judgment against her would be res judicata in a future action for
unpaid rent. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 835 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
2. Commissioner's Order No. 55-1503, dated August 11, 1955, sets forth Standards
of Habitability. Section 2304 of the Housing Regulations provides: "No persons shall
rent or offer to rent any habitation, or the furnishings thereof, unless such habitation
and its furnishings are in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair, and free from
rodents or vermin." Section 2501 states: "Every premises acommodating one or
more habitations shall be maintained and kept in repair so as to provide decent living
accommodations for the occupants. This part of the Code contemplates more than mere
basic repairs and maintenance to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include
repairs and maintenance designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy and
safe."
1968 ] RECENT CASES 1117
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, held, reversed. Where
violations of housing regulations exist prior to an agreement to lease,
the letting of such premises constitutes an illegal and unenforceable
contract which defeats a landlord's action for possession and non-
payment of rent. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1968).
At common law, the lessee was regarded as the purchaser of an
estate in land, and as such, responsible for certain minor repairs,
due to his obligation to return the premises to his grantor at the end
of the term in the same condition as it was when let to him. Major
repairs, however, and care of certain facilities were within the purview
of the landlord. For example, the tenant was exempted from repair
of heating and plumbing utilities, which, in addition to their com-
plicated nature, come not only under the tenant's physical control,
but also under that of the landlord.3 However, should the landlord
fail to make needed repairs, the tenant was still responsible for the
rent, as he had purchased an estate in land, while the condition of
the structure upon the land was of tangential concern at common
law. Indeed, traditionally, to be freed from liability for rent, the
tenant had to be evicted. More recently, however, courts have found
a constructive eviction where the premises are made uninhabitable by
virtue of the landlord's neglect.4 The doctrine of constructive eviction,
as it originally evolved, required that the tenant abandon the dwell-
ing,5 for otherwise the premises could not logically be considered unin-
habitable. Population increase and urban in-migration have relaxed
the strict requirement of abandonment. The New York courts were
among the first to take judicial notice of the critical housing shortage
after World War II, and in several instances found a constructive
eviction without abandonment, realizing that for those whose income
dictated residence in dwellings unlikely to be in repair when rented
or to be repaired thereafter, moving elsewhere was an unreasonable
burden.6 Decisions of this nature went far in alleviating the tenant's
plight, but he was still subject to an action for eviction by the landlord
unable to extract rent.
In the instant case, the court relied not upon constructive eviction,
but rather upon a comparison of the premises with the requirements
of the housing regulations. When the lease agreement was made, the
3. For a discussion of control of permanent fixtures and appliances, see Legal
Remedies of Slum Tenants, 13 (unpublished paper of Washington University School
of law).
4. See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 CEo.
LJ. 519 (1965).
5. E.g., Goldsmith v. Gisler, 150 A.2d 462 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1959).
6. E.g., Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1950); Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946).
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dwelling was not "in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair,
and free from rodents and vermin,"7 nor were repairs subsequently
made to meet such a standard. The court reasoned that the housing
regulations were based on strong public policy sentiment, so much
so that violation of them carried a possible jail sentence and a fine."
From this the court concluded that the lease contract was made in
furtherance of illegal conduct, and as such was unenforceable, afford-
ing the landlord neither a right to reclaim possession nor to demand
payment of rent due.
The instant decision is a refreshing example of judicial forthright-
ness. It is based not on the legal sophistry of constructive eviction,
but rather on the simple principle that certain conduct is intolerable
in a civilized society, and contracts made to further such conduct
will not be given the approval of a court of law. For low-income
residents of the District of Columbia, the instant decision is a long-
sought defense against the landlord's ability to extort rent for a
dwelling, the only virtue of which is all too often a mere roof and
four walls. However, the decision, and the regulations which support
it, cannot solve the problems of the urban poor who must rent
shelter. Nor do they offer protection to the landlord who may well
not know of the condition of his building (although ownership itself
should impart constructive notice). Neither is a decision of this
nature able to compel repairs, or to assure that repairs will be of
standard quality if made, for it may often be less expensive for the
owner to pay a fine for violation, or merely to allow the building to
decay until finally purchased by urban renewal.
Attempts to equalize the bargaining power of the low-income tenant
and the landlord began with building codes and regulations, and the
sheer pragmatic difficulty of their enforcement in urban areas must
be considered. In order to enforce a code, dwellings must be visually
compared with the standard set by law; thus most codes require
yearly inspection of all dwellings. In the District of Columbia the
number of buildings dictates merely an exterior survey.9 Reinspection
of buildings previously found guilty of violations is more frequent,
but inspection in general is costly and brings little relief to the tenants.
For example, in one year the District of Columbia's Department of
Licenses and Inspections, with eighty-four inspectors, had an annual
budget of $774,837, or a per capita expenditure of $1.01, the latter
figure exceeding that for the cities of New York, Chicago, and
7. District of Columbia Housing Regulations § 2501 (1955).
8. District of Columbia Housing Regulations § 2104 (1955).
9. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 H1My. L. REv. 801, 807
(1966).
1968 ] RECENT CASES 1119
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Philadelphia. 10 The 1960 Census reported that in Washington there
were 3,870 "dilapidated" units, 23,143 "deteriorating" units, and
16,909 units lacking some or all plumbing." It is hardly realistic to
suppose that the problem has been alleviated in the last eight years,
considering population increase and in-migration. Once a violation
is reported and inspected, the city enforcement agency must locate
and serve process on the landlord, a formidable problem if the
dwelling is owned by a dummy corporation or a non-resident. The
complexity of the situation is further heightened by the enormous
number of complaints confronting the agency. In Chicago, one court
is reported to have handled 120 to 300 cases per day, at a rate of one
per minute.'2 With a problem of this magnitude, justice can be done
to neither landlord nor tenant, and codes can only begin to cope
with it.
In order to alleviate the effect of abuses of the disparity in bargain-
ing power, a number of sanctions have been proposed or actually
made available against landlords, some public, some combining public
and private initiative, and others more nearly private, in the nature
of the instant case. The most obvious public remedy is the imposition
of a fine, possibly a "cumulative civil penalty" to be imposed upon
landlords whose dwellings are in violation of the code.13 A small sum
could be set for each violation and cumulated until repairs are made.
For example, if the penalty were set, as has been suggested, at $3 and
there were five violations, the owner would become liable for $15 per
day, or $105 for each week that the violations went uncorrected. If
the landlord is inaccessible, the fee could be taken from the rent due
him. Furthermore, in a civil proceeding such as this, the authors of
the proposal suggest that an in rem action might be taken against the
building itself if the landlord cannot be located. The authors would
include as part of their program a civil housing court which would
serve all facets of the landlord-tenant relationship, 4 including educat-
ing both parties as to their rights and the facilities (for example,
federal and state aid for rehabilitating buildings) available to them.
This proposal has many merits, among them the stiffness of the
10. Id. at 804 n.19.
11. U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960, Census Tracts, Parts 164-80
(Washington, D.C.-Maryland-Virginia) 151 (1960).
12. Chicago Daily News, May 22, 1963, at 1, col. 1.
13. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLum. L. REv. 1254, 1281 (1966).
14. Outside the judicial field, other remedies are suggested, particularly a recent case
in Boston in which the Rabbinical Court of the Associated Synagogues of Massachu-
setts, relying on the landlord-tenant code in the Talmud, took jurisdiction over certain
Jewish landlords, forcing an arbitration and eventually execution of a housing agree-
ment between the landlords and their dissident slum tenants. Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
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penalty against the landlord; $15 per day adds up to over $5000 per
year, and is thus a strong incentive to compliance. Unlike the District
of Columbia scheme, the owner cannot pay a mere $300 and leave
the violations uncorrected. A second possible public remedy, used in
several cities, including Washington, D.C., is the requirement of
securing a license before renting; to merit the license the building
must meet code specifications. The license fees can be used to defray
the costs of inspection and repairs, although it seems unlikely that
the fees could equal the cost of repairs. One need only glance at
the figures cited for Washington, D.C., on the number of dilapidated
and deteriorated units to measure the worth of the license system.
15
A somewhat more satisfactory remedy lies in the appointment of a
receiver to enforce the building code. Under this quasi-public scheme,
if the owner, after notice, fails to make the repairs, the city would be
empowered to appoint a receiver, make the repairs, and retain a lien
on the landlord's future rents until the cost of repairs is paid. The
great advantage to a receivership is that it ensures that the repairs will
in fact be made, and made in accordance with statutory standards.
However, the plan is not entirely problem-free. Would-be mortgagees
may well be unwilling to lend money to owners if they know their lien
will be junior to that of the city. The most inhibiting factor is that
there is no guarantee that the city will ever recoup its expenses after
having made the repairs; in New York City, of $820,000 spent in one
year for repairs, only $30,000 was recovered. 16 Another quasi-public
remedy, in force in New York and Illinois, authorizes withholding of
rent by the welfare department. In Illinois,17 upon receipt of a com-
plaint, the agency inspects the tenement, and if a violation is dis-
covered, gives the landlord ten days in which to correct it; otherwise
the rent is withheld by the welfare agency. The tenant has the
defense of code violation should the landlord elect to evict him for
non-payment of rent. Once the repairs are made, the rent is restored
to the owner. The New York statute 8 provides for total rent abate-
ment during the violation's continuation with no restoration of with-
held rent. These statutes, however, are not free from inadequacies.
First, there is no way to protect the tenant from retaliation such as
eviction or refusal to provide critical facilities.' 9 Furthermore, the
landlord may refuse thereafter to rent to welfare recipients. And
15. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
16. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 13, at 1275 n.94.
17. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1967).
18. N.Y. Soc. WELF. LAw § 143-b (McKinney 1966).
19. In Chicago, landlords turned off the heat in welfare tenants' buildings following
a complaint. Comment, Rent Withholding: Public and Private, 2 HAv. Crv. Lm.-Civ.
RiHrrs L. REv. 179, 181 (1967), citing the Chicago Daily News, Jan. 18, 1966.
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finally, the statute does not protect those who do not receive welfare
payments.
More directly private remedial schemes are also possible. In New
York City" if an agency has already recorded violations against a
certain landlord, the tenant may withhold rent if there is a judicially
determined constructive eviction. However, few tenants would be
willing to take it upon themselves to decide that there was a construc-
tive eviction, risking subsequent disagreement by the courts. In
Massachusetts the tenant may withhold rent if the violation "en-
dangers or materially impairs" the health and safety of the occu-
pants.21 For non-welfare tenants, New York state requires that each
separate violation, not the violations taken cumulatively, pose such a
danger.22 Rent withholding is thus, at best, a tricky business for the
tenant, for it places the initiative on him, not upon the wrongdoer;
and, in the absence of a statute providing legal aid, it adds the
burden of defending this initiative in a court of law. Furthermore,
the standard for withholding is generally high, and the tenant is
unlikely to know whether or not his grievance meets the test. Another
ingenious proposal suggests that slumlordism be treated as a tort,
somewhat akin to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.2 3 The authors of this proposal feel that the basis for this tort-
outrageous conduct and an individual's reaction to it-should be
altered to emphasize not the individual's reaction, but the conduct
of the offender. The landlord, for his own economic gain, provides a
dwelling which is "inconsistent with those standards which represent
minimal social goals as to decent treatment and in a manner that is
violative of the law, under circumstances where the victim had no
meaningful alternative but to deal with him . . ."24 The authors
cogently argue by analogy that the law would not allow a doctor to
capitalize on a pre-existing physical illness by giving shoddy medical
treatment merely because he can make money doing it and a large
number of people need his services; therefore, the law should not
allow landlords to capitalize on similarly pre-existing social ills.
None of the suggested or presently used methods of eradicating
substandard housing guarantees the attainment of their goal, decent
housing. Economic whips such as the cumulative penalty or tort
action may provide some relief, but they may merely encourage the
owner to abandon the building, thus adding to urban overcrowding.
Also, the backlog of cases and plethora of red tape produce delay.
20. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW § 755 (1963).
21. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 239, § 8a (Supp. 1967).
22. N.Y. MULaTIPLE DWELLING LAW § 302-a(2)a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
23. Sax & Heistrand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
24. Id. at 890.
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Other factors inhibit attainment of decent housing: the tenant's
ignorance of his rights, inertia in the face of overcrowding, low wages
or no wages, inaccessibility to industry because of poor public trans-
portation systems, first and second-hand knowledge of just causes
lost in administrative apathy, lack of child-care to allow access to an
agency, and inability (due to poor education) to explain problems
articulately to someone who might help. Economic pressures are on
the landlord too, forcing him in some cases to succumb to slumlordism.
The President's Commission on Civil Disorders points out that as a
neighborhood becomes a ghetto, the need for services increases;
police, fire and health departments are in greater demand than they
were in the formerly stable neighborhood.25 Consequently, property
taxes must be increased to meet this need. An owner seeing his tax
rise to double that of his suburban counterpart may well be unable
to afford to provide decent housing. He knows that the only immedi-
ate way to lower the tax assessment is to lower the value of his
property-to allow it to deteriorate. The incentive to maintain his
building is removed and the neighborhood crumbles further. Rent
subsidy proposals would seem to solve many problems. Presumably
where there is the ability to pay for better housing, that housing
will arise. Were this to occur, other problems are posed: the length
of time required; disposition of the poor in the interim; whether re-
pairs will be made in present buildings; where new housing, if built,
will be located in densely populated areas. And perhaps the greatest
nagging doubt about rent subsidies is that they will merely inflate
rents and result in no improvement, except to the landlord's pocket-
book. Perhaps the only real solution to this problem, made enormous
by the numbers of people involved and grotesque by its brutal effects
on the individual, lies in some form of income redistribution, prefer-
ably in general, and at the very least, in particular as related to
housing. Such a complete economic and social overhaul is far in
the future, however, if not wishful thinking altogether. In the mean-
time, the instant court has demonstrated that ingenious and sympathet-
ic use of existing public remedies may result in effective private
remedies, thus shifting somewhat the burdens of sustaining the con-
troversy away from the tenant and the city, and on to the landlord.
Such implication of private remedies from the policies underlying
statutes providing public remedies is not an altogether novel judicial
strategem, but one particularly to be commended in such an area as
housing, where the disparity in bargaining power is often so immense.
A defense to a private action, operating in the nature of self help on
the part of the tenant, not only adds to the strength and dignity of
25. REPORT OF THE U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMIM'N ON CIviL DIsORDERs 31 (1968).
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the tenant and thus tends to alleviate long term inequality, but
effectively provides a supplemetary means of enforcing more immedi-
ate, though demonstrably less effective, public remedies, such as
building and housing codes.
Procedure-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
Amended Rule 23 Requires Liberal Construction
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all other purchasers and sellers
of odd-lots' on the New York Stock Exchange during the years 1960-
1966 (numbering approximately 3,758,000 persons), sought damages
and injunctive relief against the New York Stock Exchange for viola-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and against two broker-
age firms3 for violation of the Sherman Act.4 A federal district court
sustained defendant's contention that the action was not maintainable
as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on the grounds that the plaintiff could not fairly and properly rep-
resent the other members of his class; that questions common to the
class did not predominate over questions affecting individual mem-
bers; and that there were potentially great difficulties involved in
giving adequate notice to the other members of the class.5 On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held,
reversed and remanded. Whenever there is inadequate information
to determine if the requisites of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and due process are present, a federal district court must
conduct evidentiary hearings before deciding if a class action is main-
1. An odd-lot is a transaction involving less than 100 shares (10 for a few issues)
of a security. They are handled by special dealers who trade from their own account
and charge a small differential above or below the price of the auction market. An
individual buying in odd-lot quantities must first contact a regular brokerage house,
which in turn orders from an odd-lot dealer. The customer's cost includes the broker's
fee plus an "odd-lot differential" which goes to the odd-lot dealer. This differential
has been subject to severe criticism. See, e.g., SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF
SEcunrriEs MAuRx-rs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1963).
2. The plaintiff alleged that the New York Stock Exchange had failed to protect
odd-lot investors as required by the Securities and Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b),
78f(d), 78s(a) (1964).
3. These firms were Carlisle & Jacquelin and DeCoppet & Doremus, who collectively
handled 99% of the volume of odd-lot transactions during 1960-1966. SEC, RI'onT
OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECuRITIES MARKETs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 172 (1963).
4. Plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to monopolize odd-lot trading and the fixing of
excessive odd-lot differentials. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1964).
5. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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tainable. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
It has long been recognized in equity that the essence of a class
action lies in the fact that a few members of the class may bring
action through which they would litigate the common problems of the
entire class." This prevents multiple suits and permits all claimants
to obtain redress even though their claims may be too small to warrant
individual litigation. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
adopted in 1937, reflected this heritage by providing three types of
class actions: true, hybrid, and spurious. True class actions resulted
in a judgment binding all class members,8 while hybrid class actions
concluded claims regarding property.9 Spurious class actions, where
class members united by a common question of law or fact sought
common relief for various claims, were binding only on the actual
parties to the litigation. 10 In effect, this spurious class action was
really a permissive joinder device." Since the great majority of class
actions were spurious, the objective of making a binding determina-
tion of all questions in a single suit which would be conclusive for
the whole class was often frustrated.12 Consequently, to eliminate
this and other problems, Rule 23 was amended in 1966 to provide
for a single class action in which judgments are binding on all mem-
bers of the class not specifically opting out.'3 Under the new Rule
6. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853) (6 preachers and members
of the Methodist Church on behalf of 1500 traveling preachers); See generally Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (524 complainants on behalf of
over 70,000 fellow members of a fraternal organization); 3A J. MooRE, FE.AL
PRAcTIcE, f[ 23.02, at 3409 (2d ed. 1967).
7. Compare 226 U.S. 659 (1912) (Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice in Equity promul-
gated by the United States Supreme Court), with Notes of Advisory Committee on
former Rule 23, cited in 28 U.S.C.A. at 147 (1958).
8. A true class action is marked by joint or derivative rights such that if there
were no class action, all members of the class would have to be joined anyway. See
3A J. MOORE, FEA.L PRACTICE, ff 23.08 at 3435 (2d ed. 1967); Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO.
L.J. 551, 570-71 (1937); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L.
REv. 629 (1966).
9. In a hybrid class action, the class members have interests that are several rather
than joint or common, but are united by a right to a common fund or common
property. See Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3rd Cir. 1941);
2 BAR ON & HoLzoFF, FEDRA..L PRACTICE "ND PRoCEDUoE § 562.2 at 272 (1961);
3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTI E, f[ 23.09 at 3439 (2d ed. 1967).
10, See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562.3 (1961);
3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, II 23.10 at 3442 (2d ed. 1967).
11. See, e.g., Carroll v. American Fed. of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155 (1967), rev'd,
391 U.S. 99 (1968) (antitrust violation by musicians' union); 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcrIcE, ff 23.10 at 3442 (2d ed. 1967).
12. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
13. "The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
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23(a), to be maintainable as a class action, four requisites must be
met: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all its mem-
bers is impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties must be able to protect fairly and
adequately the interests of the class.14 In addition, the prospective
class action must possess one of the three alternative requisites of
Rule 23(b). One such requisite is that questions of law or fact
common to the class must predominate over questions affecting only
individual members.15 It has been held that in some situations the
interests of individuals may differ to such a degree that common
questions cannot be considered predominant, and consequently class
adjudication would raise insuperable problems of management.
16
However, courts have held that the rule does not require that all
members of the class be identically situated in all particulars, but
simply that there be substantial questions, either of law or fact,
common to all.'1 Furthermore, the fact that members of a class may
seek differing amounts of damages has never been a sufficient bar to
class action.' Since all members of the class may be bound by a
class action, the courts are careful to require that the litigant ade-
quately represent the rest of his class.19 It has also been held that
courts must consider the number of plaintiffs bringing suit in rela-
the class, shall include ...those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2)
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class." FE. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). The other alternatives include the risk of inconsistent
class determinative adjudications if separate actions were brought or if the other
party's action was based on grounds generally applicable to the class, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (1), and the inapplicability of the class action if the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (2).
16. See, e.g., School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267
F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (conspiracy by jobbers and wholesalers to fix prices
of children's books), where it was held that common questions were not predominant
in view of the commercially unique product involved and the different requirements and
methods of purchasing of the various class members.
17. City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(class actions by various governmental agencies alleging conspiracy to fix salt prices).
See also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (anti-
trust class action by 5 of 650 franchisees).
18. See, e.g., Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 91 (7th Cir. 1941) (class
action by 2 jobbers of gasoline on behalf of 900 class members for alleged price
fixing of gasoline); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (class action by 3 shareholders on behalf of all shareholders for rescission of
security purchases because of fraudulent inducement).
19. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if ... the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (4).
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tion to the size of the class as an indication of the adequacy of rep-
resentation.20 Some courts have determined that a small number of
claimants cannot represent a large class,21 while others have allowed
very small percentages to maintain a class action on the ground that
once the action has begun, others may wish to enter.22 It is also im-
portant to note that the res judicata effect of court decisions in class
actions makes applicable the constitutional requirement of due process
which demands the giving of "notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions." 3 Some cases have held that actual notice to all class members
is necessary,2 4 while other courts have approved notice by publica-
tion.25
In the instant case, the court carefully noted that the "letter and
spirit" of the new Rule 23 require a liberal interpretation of its pro-
visions. Consequently, the court was unwilling to dismiss the instant
class action without additional evidence clearly showing that the
requisites of Rule 23 and due process could not be met by the plaintiff.
The court found that the plaintiff might have satisfied the four re-
quirements of Rule 23(a), reasoning that 3,758,000 persons were
obviously too numerous to join as separate parties, that there were
questions of fact and law common to the class, and that all members
had the same complaint as the instant plaintiff. Surmising that the
plaintiff might adequately represent his class despite its size, the court
noted that the disparate size of the class in relation to the single
plantiff, a factor so heavily relied on by the lower court in its refusal
to find a maintainable class action, is only one factor to be considered
in determining whether representation will be adequate, particularly
since the primary function of the class action is to permit a small
part of the class to assert the rights of the entire class. Consequently,
the court held that in determining the adequacy of representation,
20. See, e.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940) (court dismissed class action by one former
employee on behalf of "thousands" of defendant's employees for distribution of sur-
pluses from group insurance policy).
21. See, e.g., Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942)
(dismissal of class action by insuror-against one pledge debtor as representative-of
5,000 other pledge debtors to clarify liability under fire insurance contract).
22. E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (5 of
650 franchisees may bring class action for antitrust violation).
23. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (pe-
tition by bank for settlement of accounts of persons with interest in common trust
fund); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
24. E.g., Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
25. E.g., Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(one taxpayer, representing class of "several hundred thousand," sought equitable re-
lief for defendant's fraudulent leasing of city property).
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the district court should have given greater consideration to such
factors as the competency of the litigant's attorney, the possibility of
collusion, and the similarity of the interests of the litigant and the
other class members.26 In addition, the court found that the require-
ments of 23(b) (3) were met, since the antitrust violations practiced
against the entire class presented common questions of sufficient
weight to predominate over questions affecting only individual mem-
bers. The court thus remanded the case, ordering the district court
to hold hearings to determine whether or not plaintiff could ade-
quately represent the class and whether or not there were feasible
methods of administering an action and judgment for this numerous
class, particularly as regarded the problem of notifying the class
members of the pending action. Although noting that "some sort of
ritualistic notice in small print on the back of a newspaper would in
no event suffice,"2 7 the court found that the absence of facts as to
the identity of the class members made it impossible to determine
whether notice by publication or individual notice would satisfy due
process. If, after evidentiary hearings, the lower court found that
individual notice was required, the present court indicated that it
would permit dismissal of the case if the plaintiff was not willing
to finance this costly notification.
As the first appellate court interpretation of the new Rule 23, this
case could provide an important precedent. The instant court clearly
rejected the more restrictive view of the class action8 and found
that a liberal approach29 was more within "the letter and spirit" of
the new rule.30 Consequently, in rejecting the district court's quanti-
tative determination of adequate representation, the court left open
the possibility of an increased use of the class action by an insignificant
member of a very large class. In the area of civil rights, particularly,
the instant holding could be crucial, as one member of a minority
group could conceivably assert the rights of the entire group through
the vehicle of a class action. In Flast v. Cohen,31 although not a class
action, the United States Supreme Court permitted a single taxpayer
to challenge the constitutionality of the use of federal taxing and
spending power in using federal funds for parochial schools. In accord
26. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968). The court
cited no authority delineating these three requirements.
27. Id. at 569.
28. See, e.g., School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267
F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (class action not maintainable because there were
no common questions of law or fact despite allegation of national conspiracy affecting
all buyers of children's books).
29. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
30. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. 392 U.S. 83.
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with the instant cases, the threat of opening a floodgate of suits did
not frighten the Court into dismissing the suit. While the limits of the
instant holding are unknown, it is doubtful that a class action would
be extended to a class as large as 100,000,000 (all eligible voters). If,
however, Flast and Eisen indicate a trend, then a person with a very
small interest relative to the interests of the whole class will be able
to assert his rights and the rights of the class in a court of law. Yet,
it is submitted that the instant holding presents several problems
which may defeat its liberal approach. The court expressly says that
the class members must be notified either personally or by publication,
but does nothing more than remand to the district court to decide
which means is required and how this is to be accomplished. It is
highly possible that the mere requirement of notice will make the
action far too expensive for the plantiff with a small interest at stake
($70 here). Similarly, the administration of this action may prove too
complex because the class is so large and diverse. The district court's
determination of these matters on remand should be of crucial im-
portance to the future use of the class action. Regardless, the liberal,
permissive tenor of the instant holding itself may influence the future
of Rule 23.
Trade Regulation-Section 2(d) of the
Robinson-Patman Act Requires Promotional
Allowances to Direct Buyers To Be Made
Available to All Retailers Purchasing
Through Wholesalers
The Federal Trade Commission charged respondents, Fred Meyer,
Inc., a supermarket chain,' and its officers, with violating section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act2 by inducing certain suppliers
to engage in discriminatory sales promotional activities prohibited by
section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act.3 The chain had solicited
1. Fred Meyer, Inc., operated a chain of thirteen supermarkets in the Portland,
Oregon area which sold retail groceries, drugs, variety items, and a limited line of
clothing. According to its 1960 prospectus, Meyer made one-fourth of the retail food
sales in the Portland area and was the second largest seller of all goods in that area.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). This section declares unlawful any unfair methods of
competition and any unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and authorizes the Com-
mission to prevent such unfair methods and practices by instituting proceedings
against suspected violators.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964). "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
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promotional allowance payments from two of its direct suppliers of
canned goods, in return for including their respective products in
the 1957 Meyer promotional campaign.4 The two suppliers also
sold to wholesalers who resold to Meyer's retail competitors, but did
not make promotional allowances comparable to those received by
Meyer available to either the wholesalers or the retail competitors.
The Commission found that the two suppliers had violated section
2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act 5 and ordered respondents to cease
solicting promotional allowance payments unless such allowances
were made available, on a proportionately equal basis, to wholesalers
who purchased from the same suppliers for resale to Meyer's retail
competitors. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing
in part,? agreed with respondents that section 2(d) did not apply to
the suppliers because Meyer, a retailer, was not "competing" with
the wholesalers, and because the retailers competing with Meyer were
not "customers" of the suppliers.8 On certiorari to the United States
commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit
of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in
consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in
connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering for sale of any products or
commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such persons, unless such
payment or consideration is available on proportionately equal terms to all other cus-
tomers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
4. Since 1936, Meyer had promoted its products by distributing coupon books
featuring products sold at reduced prices. Meyer financed the promotion by charging
consumers a nominal ten cents for the coupon books and by charging the supplier
of each featured product a fee of at least $350 for each coupon page advertising his
product; the total revenues received exceeded the costs of conducting the advertising
campaign. Some participating suppliers further underwrote the promotion by giving
Meyer price reductions on its purchases of featured items, by replacing at no cost a
percentage of the goods sold by Meyer during the campaign, or by redeeming coupons
in cash at an agreed rate.
5. The participation of one supplier, Tri-Valley, in the promotion was challenged
by the FTC in a separate action, and the Commission's finding that it violated § 2(d)
was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694
(9th Cir. 1964).
6. Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] CCH TnADE lREn. REP. II 16,368
(FTC 1963). Commissioner Elman dissented in part on the ground that the order
should have required the promotional allowances to be made available to the retailers
competing with Meyer rather than to wholesalers who resold to the retailers. Id. at
21,231.
7. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966).
8. The court upheld the Commission's finding that respondents violated § 2(f) of
the Clayton Act by inducing suppliers to violate § 2(a) prohibiting price discrimination,
and that Meyer knew or had reason to know of the unlawfulness of the payments it
induced. The court also rejected respondents' arguments that inducement of dispropor-
tionate promotion payments is not cognizable under § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, and that the Commission's order was too broad and improperly
directed against the corporate officers as individuals.
9. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited question of "[w]hether a
supplier's granting to a retailer who buys directly from it promotional allowances that
are not made available to the wholesaler who resells to retailers competing with the
Supreme Court, held, reversed. A supplier's payment of promotional
allowances to a direct-buying retailer without making them available
on comparable terms to other retailers who buy the supplier's products
through wholesalers and sell in competition with the direct-buyer is a
violation of section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. FTC v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
When Congress amended section 2 of the Clayton Act 0 by enacting
the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, one of its primary purposes was to
restore "equality of opportunity" in business by eliminating both
direct and indirect forms of price discrimination which threatened the
competitive position of the small independent merchant." Section
2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to prevent the
practice of disguising lower prices as promotional or advertising
allowances' 2 and required manufacturers and suppliers to make all
advertising and sales promotional allowances available on propor-
tionately equal terms to "customers competing in the distribution" of
their products. In interpreting section 2(d) ,13 both the courts and
the Federal Trade Commission have held that buyers who compete14
direct-buying retailer violates Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act." 386 U.S. 907
(1967). The Court denied respondents' petition for review of the adverse holdings
of the Court of Appeals. 386 U.S. 908 (1967).
10. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) as amended 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 et seq.
(1964).
11. An investigation of chain store buying practices undertaken by the FTC at the
request of Congress had indicated that § 2 of the Clayton Act was an inadequate
deterrent against outright price discrimination, and also revealed certain discriminatory
practices wholly beyond the reach of § 2, by which large buyers induced concessions
which their smaller competitors could not obtain. See FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE
CIrALN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. REP.
No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936); S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1936). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, see
C. AUsTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMs UNDER = RoBINsoN-
PA'nAN AcT (2d rev. ed. 1959); C. EDwARDs, THE PnIcE DISCRL-MNATION LAw
(1959); G. FELDMAN & B. ZORN, ROnINSoN-PATmAN ACT: AvERTISING AND PRONXO-
TIONAL ALLOWANCES (1948); F. RoWE, PRICE DisCRIMIATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN AcT (1962, Supp. 1984).
12. In recommending the enactment of § 2(d), the Senate Judiciary Committee noted
that such allowances become unjust whether the promotional service is rendered or
not, if the payment is grossly in excess of its value, or if the customer derives an
equal benefit to his own business and is thus enabled to shift to his vendor substantial
portions of his own advertising cost which his smaller competitor, unable to command
such allowances, cannot do. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
13. The term "customer" as used in § 2(d) has been given the same meaning as
"purchaser" in both § 2(a), dealing with price discrimination, and § 2(e), dealing with
furnishing of services to a buyer, in order to harmonize what are regarded as parallel
sections of a unified statute. See, e.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Guss
Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 992-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945);
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 189 (1955).
14. The term "competitors" is defined to include sellers of products of like grade
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on the same functional level' 5 are entitled to equal promotional allow-
ance treatment if they buy directly from the same supplier.16 The
Third Circuit has sought to limit this interpretation of the Robinson-
Patman Act by holding that direct-buying competitors were the only
business category entitled to equal treatment.17 However, most courts
have recognized the "indirect customer" doctrine which extends the
interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act to include retailers who
purchase indirectly through wholesalers and compete with a direct
buyer, provided that the supplier deals directly with the retailer in
promoting the sale of his products and exercises control over the terms
upon which the retailer buys.' In cases where the "indirect cus-
tomer" doctrine was inapplicable, 9 the decisions have been inconsis-
and quality (incorporated into § 2(d) from express language in § 2(a)) trading in
the same geographic area at the same approximate time. E.g., Simplicity Pattern Co.
v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958), reo'd in part on other grounds, 360 U.S. 55
(1959) (geographic area); Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir.
1958) (geographic area, like grade and quality); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C.
89 (1954) (same approximate time).
15. The courts and the Commission focused on the actuality of competition regardless
of variations in marketing technique or functional labels. See, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959) (department store and fabric shop in competition
for customers of dress patterns); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952)
(wholesalers, retailers, and applicators all in competition); Liggett & Meyers Tobacco
Co., 56 F.T.C. 221 (1959) (retail sales by vending machines and over-the-counter in
competition for cigarette consumers); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956)
(grocery wholesalers and institutional distributors in competition). For cases finding
absence of functional competition, see notes 18-22 infra and accompanying text.
16. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221 (1959) (wholesalers); Elizabeth
Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 806 (1947) (retailers).
17. See Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), aff'd, 237 F.2d 13
(3d Cir. 1956) (private treble damages action under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) for
alleged violations of § 2(a)).
18. The doctrine was first announced by the Commission in Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). Accord, K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp.
310 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); American News Co., 58 F.T.C. 10 (1961), afJ'd, 300 F.2d 104
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); cf. Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc.,
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] CCH TnADE EG. REP. 1[ 16,666 (FTC 1965) (vhole-
saler a wholly owned subsidiary of supplier); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89
(1954) (supplier negotiated sales and credits); Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940)
(price controlled by supplier).
19. To support the doctrine, certain minimum contacts must exist between the
supplier and the retailer. Compare Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221
(1959) (mere "missionary" activity and sporadic inventory refilling by supplier did
not make retailers his customers), with FTC Advisory Opinion No. 143, 3 CCH TnADE
REG. REP. ff 18,060 (FTC 1967) (supplier who makes advertising allowances to a
reseller adopts retailer as his customer), and Sunbeam Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer
Binder] CCH TrPADE REG. REP. ff 17,178 (FTC 1965) (supplier who grants advertising
allowances to retailer makes him his customer).
Apparently, prior to the instant case, no court had considered the possibility of
according promotional allowances to retailers who purchased from a wholesaler in the
absence of adequate "indirect" contacts. Cf. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d
132, 135 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947), where the court refused
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tent as to whether customers operating at different functional levels
of distribution are entitled to proportional equality under section
2(d). A New Jersey District Court held that promotional allowances
given to a direct-buying retailer must be made available to whole-
salers whose customers compete with the retailer receiving the allow-
ance, even though the wholesaler is not impaired in his ability to
compete on his own distributive leveL20 On the other hand, the
Commission has ruled that promotional allowance payments to a
retail grocery chain did not require comparable treatment of whole-
salers who resold to retailers, since the wholesalers were not "in
competition" with the retail chain.21 In Guides adopted in 1960, the
Commission left the issue open, declaring that "all types of competing
customers" must be allowed to participate in the supplier's promo-
tional programs, and defined "customer" to mean "someone who buys
directly from the seller or his agent or broker."2 Although the
Supreme Court had not directly construed section 2(d), it had indi-
cated that resellers on different functional levels would not be
considered competitors under the Robinson-Patman Act unless the
intent of Congress to employ a broader definition was clearly proved.23
In the instant case the Court reasoned that the broad goals of the
Robinson-Patman Act to improve the competitive position of small
businessmen against the large chain stores2 required a finding that a"customer" within the meaning of section 2(d) included retailers who
purchased through wholesalers and resold in competition with a
direct buyer. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would frustrate
the purpose of section 2(d) and lead to the anomalous result that
direct-buying retailers, large enough to undertake their own whole-
saling function, would be protected by the provisions of section 2(d),
while the smaller retailers whose only access to suppliers is through
independent wholesalers would not be entitled to this same protection.
The Court found that the requirements of the "indirect customer"
to consider whether retailers buying from intermediate purchasers are customers of the
supplier within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.
20. Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D. N.J. 1956).
21. Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 258 F.2d
365 (2d Cir. 1958); cf. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del. 1956)
(§ 2(a) price discrimination prohibitions not applicable as between retailers and whole-
saler); Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947) (equation of retailers and jobbers
with respect to § 2(a) but not with respect to § 2(d)). But cf. Liggett & Meyers
Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221, 252 (1959), where the Commission declined to decide
"whether a seller need make its promotional allowances available only to those of its
customers who are operating at the same functional level."
22. FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
Services, 16 C.F.R. §§ 240.9, 240.3 (1968).
23. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963). See note 25 infra.
24. 390 U.S. at 349, citing FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.,. 363 U.S. 160, -168 (1960).
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doctrine rest on too narrow a reading of the Robinson-Patman Act,
holding that retailers who buy through wholesalers are "customers"
within the meaning of section 2(d), whether or not there are "direct
dealings" between the two. The Court further found that section
2(d) does not require proportional equality between Meyer and the
two wholesalers, since Meyer's retail competitors, rather than the
wholesalers, are "competing customers" under the statute.2 The
Court concluded that a supplier who gives allowances to a direct-
buying retailer must also make them available in comparable terms
to those who buy his products through wholesalers and compete with
the direct buyer in resales.2 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting,2 disagreed
that the "broad goals" of the Robinson-Patman Act required that
disfavored retailers be treated as "customers" under section 2(d).
Noting that the Commission refused to accept the interpretation
adopted by the majority of the Court, and further noting that Congress
had not explicitly defined the term "competing customer," Justice
Harlan preferred to read the statute as narrowly as possible.2
The Court's decision to enforce section 2(d) by requiring propor-
tionately equal treatment of all competing retailers correctly reflects
the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act to protect small retailers from
promotional allowance discrimination. Although the interpretations
of both the Commission and the Ninth Circuit could also be supported
by the ambiguous definition of "competing customer" in section 2(d),
neither of those alternatives produces a more desirable result. The
25. The Court noted that Congress had used unmistakable terms to expand the
meaning of "competition" to include more than resellers operating on the same func-
tional level when in § 2(a) it prohibited price discrimination which would "injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1964). Citing FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963), the Court concluded
that the absence of such broad language in § 2(d) left the "reasonable inference"
that Congress meant to restrict the meaning of competition to customers competing
on the same functional level in the resale of the supplier's products.
26. The Court rejected the argument that its decision was impractical because sup-
pliers will not be able to bypass their wholesalers and grant allowances directly to
the retailer, thus suggesting that the supplier could always utilize the wholesalers to
distribute or administer a promotional program, provided the supplier takes ultimate
responsibility. 390 U.S. at 358. Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring, believed that the
intent of Congress could best be served by regarding the wholesaler and his retail
customer as a unit for the purposes of § 2(d), and emphasized the possibility of
dealing either directly with the retailer or indirectly by arrangement with the whole-
saler in order to provide equal treatment to all retailers. Id. at 358.
27. Mr. Justice Stewart, also dissenting, would have affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals. He believed the case should be remanded to give the respondent
an opportunity to defend against the novel construction of § 2(d) announced by the
Court, which was based on a theory not argued by either party. Id. at 364.
28. Id. at 360. Mr. Justice Harlan also believed that suppliers would find imple-
menting the Court's decision both impractical and a violation of the Sherman Act. See
notes 29 & 38 infra and accompanying text.
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Commission's alternative does not explain the wholesaler's obligation
to pass on any promotional benefits received from a supplier to his
retail customers; and it does not specify the corresponding duty of
the supplier to insure that such retailers actually receive their promo-
tional benefits. Without controls on the wholesaler, nothing can
prevent him from absorbing the allowances as profit, thus leaving
the retailer in the same position he would be in without protection of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Yet, a supplier's attempt to guarantee that
promotional allowances be passed on to a wholesaler's retail cus-
tomers is, on its face, an attempt to control the wholesaler's resale
price, and would be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.29 Further, the Commission's alternative does not define the
supplier's obligations in the event he prefers to by-pass the whole-
saler and give promotional benefits directly to the competing re-
tailers themselves. In such event, the Commission's alternative would
require simultaneous promotional payments both to wholesalers and
to their retail customers who could qualify as "indirect customers."30
The decision of the Ninth Circuit, with which Mr. Justice Harlan
and Mr. Justice Stewart agree, is based on a literal interpretation of
the meaning of "competing customer." Such interpretation leaves the
small businessman who, by his nature, must purchase through a
wholesaler, wholly without protection of the provisions of section
2(d), in direct contravention of the clearly stated intent of Congress
in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act. Mr. Justice Harlan's sugges-
tion that the Robinson-Patman Act be this narrowly construed miscon-
ceives the judicial function of statutory interpretation. Despite the
serious criticism which the Robinson-Patman Act has received,31 the
Court should not refuse to implement the statutes clearly stated
purpose in order to persuade Congress to revise the Act.
In order to implement the Court's decision, the Federal Trade
Commission is revising its Guides for Advertising Allowances and
Other Merchandising Payments and Services.3 2  These amended
Guides provide a useful and comprehensive tool for assessing, the
impact of the legal requirements of the Court's decision. One of
29. See Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act & Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reap-
praisal, 42 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1966); Millstein, Sections 2(d) & (e) Robinson-
Patman Act-Compulsory Universal Reciprocity?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 77, 89 (1968); cf.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
30. See Hickey, The Fred Meyer Case-The Implications Under Section 2(d) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 9 ANTIrrUST BULL. 255, 283 (1964); Comment, Recent Problems
Under Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 29 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 160, 178 (1961).
31. See 390 U.S. at 359-60 nn. 1-3.
32. Proposed Amended Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising




the key problems connected with furnishing promotional allowances
is the supplier's duty to inform all competing customers of the availa-
bility of his promotional plan. The revised Guides suggest several
alternatives: the supplier may use the wholesalers to reach those
retailers who buy through the wholesaler, either by having the whole-
saler notify the retailers, or by using the wholesaler's customer list for
direct notification; if the wholesalers do not cooperate, the supplier
might use third party mailing devices, or adopt other means of
notifying the retailer directly.33 In any event, the supplier must insure
that the notification plan he adopts gives actual notice to all compet-
ing retailers.M Second, a supplier's promotional plan must permit
all types of competing customers to participate, or offer sufficient
alternatives to the plan as will permit proportionately equal treatment
to all competing customers.5 Again, if the supplier's supervision of
his program indicates that one class of customers (such as retailers
buying directly from the supplier) participates in the plan to a
substantially lesser degree than other classes of customers (such as
direct-buying retailers), the supplier is on notice that his plan is
not suitable for the underparticipating class of customers.6 Third, the
supplier must distribute his payments to the retailers and insure that
the services he pays for are actually furnished. The supplier may
arrange with the wholesalers to distribute and administer the promo-
tional payments to their retail customers. Many retailers actually
prefer to pool their allowances and permit the wholesaler or other
intermediary to collect and use the payments on the retailers' behalf.3a
However, where the wholesaler refuses to cooperate, the supplier can
make payment directly to those customers who furnish appropriate
33. Proposed Guides § 240.8. Some methods of direct notification include (1)
printing the promotional offer on the shipping container or on the product package;
(2) including brochures announcing the offer in the shipping container; (3) advising
customers from accurate and complete mailing lists; and (4) publishing complete
details of the plan in trade publications guaranteed to be received by all competing
retailers.
34. id.
35. Most criticisms of the instant case are hypothetical arguments suggesting that
the Court's decision forces a manufacturer to allocate his advertising resources irra-
tionally and uneconomically to small retailers who cannot effectively promote the
supplier's product. See generally Elman, note 29 supra; Iickey, note 30 supra; Mill.
stein, note 30 supra. Such charges are best directed against the Robinson-Patnan Act
itself, rather than against the decision in the instant case, since the very nature of the
Robinson-Patman Act presupposes certain economic restraints upon large business for
the purposes of protecting smaller merchants and promoting competition.
36. Proposed Guides § 240.9.
37. The future of independent merchants appears to be in affiliation with "voluntary"
and "cooperative" groups which have shown a significant market potential. In the
grocery retail business, for example, independent retail groups share between 31% and
47% of the total market. In comparison, the chain store share of the total market in
1960 was about the same as in 1929-less than 25%. See RowE, note 11 supra at 553.
[ VOL, 211136
1968] RECENT CASES 1137
proof of performance, and avoid conflict with section 1 of the Sherman
Act.38 Fourth, any customer who knows or should know that he is
receiving payments or services which are not available in proportion-
ately equal terms to all competitors engaged in the resale of the
supplier's products, may be proceeded against under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting unfair methods of com-
petition. The customer must, therefore, take such affirmative action
as would satisfy a reasonably prudent businessman, in the light of
the previous discussion, that a supplier's promotional plan satisfies the
requirements of section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act.-
38. Proposed Guides § 240.11. Mr. Justice Harlan's argument that arrangements
between supplier and retailer would also violate the Sherman Act as a restraint of
the wholesalers is clearly unsound. Since the supplier is required to make such
allowances under § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the wholesaler is not
entitled to receive any part of the payments, it is unreasonable to suggest that the
Sherman Act was meant to prevent the implementation of the purposes of a companion
antitrust statute.
39. Proposed Guides § 240.16.
